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ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN  
DEATHS AT THE HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN AND  
RELATED MATTERS.

Hearing held  
21st floor  
180 Dundas Street West  
Toronto, Ontario

The Honourable Mr. Justice S.G.M. Grange	Commissioner
P.S.A. Lamek, Q.C.	Counsel
E.A. Cronk	Associate Counsel
Thomas Millar	Administrator

Transcript of evidence  
for

June 11, 1984

VOLUME 152

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AND RELATED MATTERS

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Hearing held on the 21st Floor,  
180 Dundas Street West, Toronto,  
Ontario, on Monday, the 11th day  
of June, 1984.

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.M. GRANGE - Commissioner

THOMAS MILLAR - Administrator

MURRAY R. ELLIOT - Registrar

APPEARANCES:

P.S.A. LAMEK, Q.C. ) Commission Counsel  
E. CRONK )

D. HUNT ) Counsel for the Attorney  
L. CECCHETTO ) General and Solicitor General  
of Ontario (Crown Attorneys  
and Coroner's Office)

I.G. SCOTT, Q.C. ) Counsel for the Hospital for  
M. THOMSON ) Sick Children  
R. BATTY )

D. YOUNG ) Counsel for the Metropolitan  
Toronto Police

W.N. ORTVED ) Counsel for numerous Doctors  
at the Hospital for Sick  
Children


D. BROWN ) Counsel for Susan Nelles -  
Nurse

(Cont'd)

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TORONTO, ONTARIO

1 APPEARANCES: (Cont'd)

2 G.R. STRATHY ) Counsel for Phyllis Trayner -  
E. FORSTER ) Nurse  
3 J. OLAH ) Counsel for Janet Brownless -  
Nurse  
4 S. LABOW ) Counsel for Mr. & Mrs. Gosselin,  
5 Mr. & Mrs. Gionas, Mr. & Mrs.  
6 Inwood, Mr. & Mrs. Turner,  
Mr. & Mrs. Murphy (parents of  
deceased children)  
7 W.W. TOBIAS ) Counsel for Mr. & Mrs. Hines  
8 (parents of deceased child  
Jordan Hines)  
9  
10  
11 VOLUME 152  
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1

I N D E X

2 ARGUMENT BY MR. LAMEK

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10 This was the time when I first saw this  
11 evidence by Mr. Lamek.

12 This evidence was given by Mr. Lamek, the same  
13 day that he gave his evidence to the Court on June 25, 1952.  
14 He stated that he had been told by Mr. Lamek that  
15 he had seen the body of Miss Mary McMurtry at the hospital  
16 about two hours before he gave his evidence to the Court.

17 This evidence was given by Mr. Lamek  
18 on the 26th day of June, 1952, before  
19 the Court.

20 The witness stated he had been told by  
21 Mr. Lamek that "the witness" whom he saw dead,  
22 was the same person whom he had seen on June 25, 1952, the  
23 same day that he gave his evidence to the Court.  
24 The witness further stated that he had been present  
25 at the hospital on the morning of June 25, 1952, when





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THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Lamek.

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ARGUMENT BY MR. LAMEK (Continued)

4

MR. LAMEK: Mr. Commissioner, when we  
came to an untimely end on Thursday I just finished  
dealing with the four children in respect of whose  
deaths Miss Nelles was charged and I told you that  
I proposed to move to three children, in whose  
bodies digoxin was found, although it had never been  
prescribed.

10

The first of those whom I start this  
morning is Jordan Hines.

11

The nursing note of Nurse Reaper for  
the long night shift of March 7th to 8th, the night  
on which Jordan Hines died, is found on page 35 of  
the chart and discloses that at 4 o'clock that  
morning Jordan Hines' apex was 182 and regular.  
That is the second last line in the note, sir.

17

"At 0400 hours apex 182 and  
regular. Respiration 54 and no noted  
distress."

18

Ten minutes later he suffered a  
cardiac arrest. 35 minutes after that he was dead.

21

Hines as a patient on Ward 4B, the  
Trayner nursing team was on duty that night on Ward  
4A. In the early part of the shift, as is apparent

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A  
D/cr





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2 from the rest of Nurse Reaper's note, Baby Hines  
3 had a regular heart rate. He fed well, vomited a  
4 small amount at 3:00 a.m. He was alert, active,  
5 voiding well. His chest was slightly congested she  
6 records. He certainly appeared to be at no risk of  
dying that night.

7 Dr. Rose, who had seen the baby  
8 briefly on rounds on Saturday, and her evidence is  
9 found at Volume 37, pages 7301 to 2, thought he was  
10 somewhat unstable, but not critical and she did not  
11 then think, she said, that Hines was a terminal case.

12 On the Saturday night, on the early  
13 Sunday morning she was called at home and told of  
14 Baby Hines' cardiac arrest.

15 Dr. Kobayashi saw the child more  
16 frequently and later in the day on Saturday than  
17 Dr. Rose did. He said and his evidence is found  
18 at Volume 142, beginning at page 2669 and going to  
19 page 2674, that on the Saturday morning the baby  
20 appeared to him to be, and I use his words "extremely  
21 stable". There was no suggestion or indication  
22 that Dr. Kobayashi thought that the baby was in a  
23 critical condition or at imminent risk of deterioration.  
24 He said that he saw Baby Hines several times during  
25 the Saturday. He saw no bradycardia nor apneic spells





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2 and, indeed, no such spell was reported to him by  
3 the nurses as having occurred.

4 At 11 o'clock at night he had no  
5 concern about the baby's condition, the baby did not  
6 appear to have changed since the morning. In the  
7 early morning, between 1 and 2 o'clock Dr. Kobayashi  
8 made final rounds before going up to bed and he saw  
9 Baby Hines. Baby Hines at that time was on cardiac  
10 monitor, which showed normal sinus rhythm. There  
11 was no feeding problem and again no apneic or  
12 bradycardiac spells.

13 It was Dr. Kobayashi's impression  
14 that clinically Baby Hines looked a great deal  
15 better than he had when he first had been admitted.  
16 He appeared to be improved and stable. Dr. Kobayashi  
17 had no concern about him.

18 He said in Volume 142, page 2680  
19 that he found the Hines' death distressing and  
20 shocking and he regarded it as unexpected and that  
21 the cause of death appeared to be a puzzle for  
22 everybody.

23 Dr. Kobayashi's impression, in my  
24 submission, was correct, that people were indeed  
25 puzzled about the cause of Baby Hines' death.

26 Dr. Rowe said, and this is in Volume  
27





1

2 17, page 2888, that he and his colleagues did not  
3 know what the cause of death was when that baby died.

4 I believe it to be fair to say, sir,  
5 that there have only ever been two real candidates  
6 for the cause of death of Jordan Hines: one, sudden  
7 infant death syndrome or two, digoxin toxicity.

8 The SIDS explanation is essentially  
9 based on Dr. Becker's findings at autopsy of changes  
10 indicative of earlier hypoxic episodes or in earlier  
missed-SIDS incident.

11 As I understand the theory is this:  
12 that infants who survive a SIDS episode, which is  
13 hence called a missed-SIDS, infants who survive such  
14 an episode frequently succumb to a subsequent SIDS  
15 episode. The pathological findings made by Dr.  
16 Becker were indicative to him of an earlier missed-  
17 SIDS episode and hence, the postulating of SIDS, as  
18 the cause of Baby Hines' death, not the episode of  
19 which pathological findings were evidence, but an  
episode of the kind known as a matter of experience  
20 and observation in the medical world to recur after  
there has been a missed-SIDS episode.

21 On the other hand, the digoxin  
22 toxicity explanation is based on findings of digoxin  
23 in the fixed and exhumed tissues of Jordan Hines,

24

25





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2 digoxin never having been prescribed for him.

3                   In my submission, sir, your conclusion  
4 as to how and by what means Jordan Hines died, comes  
5 down to a choice between those two explanations, for  
6 no other explanation has been advanced. It is plain  
7 from the evidence of the pharmacologists that the  
8 detection of digoxin in fixed, and particularly in  
9 exhumed tissues, can disclose little, if anything,  
10 as to how much digoxin was present and in what  
11 concentrations at the time of death, or as to when the  
12 digoxin was received, although perhaps what I call  
13 a not-before-time may be put upon the receipt of  
14 the digoxin.

15                  Dr. Kauffman, in Volume 72, pages  
16 5763 to 4 suggests not more than 48 hours before  
17 death.

18                  Dr. MacLeod's opinion was for a  
19 rather long period of time, as you will remember.

20                  Thus the digoxin findings in Hines  
21 only strictly indicate that at some point in time,  
22 and if you accept Dr. Kauffman's opinion, likely within  
23 48 hours prior to his death, Baby Hines somehow was  
24 given digoxin. If that occurred, clearly it was  
25 an unprescribed dose, but there is no way of knowing  
from that fact alone whether the dose was of a





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2 therapeutic size or of a toxic size, whether it was  
3 given in error or deliberately or, indeed, whether  
4 it played any part in Jordan Hines' death.

5 The point of the problem is this:

6 I think, sir, if the sudden infant death syndrome  
7 explanation does not satisfactorily account for  
8 Jordan Hines death, the only other contender is  
9 digoxin toxicity, which is made the more likely by  
10 the circumstances surrounding the child's death, in  
my submission.

11 First, with respect to the SIDS  
12 then. We have heard, and we can probably all repeat  
13 it in our sleep and probably all do repeat it in our  
14 sleep, that SIDS is a diagnosis of exclusion. That  
15 is to say, if I understand it, if there is some other  
16 condition that may reasonably explain the death, the  
diagnosis of SIDS is inappropriate.

17 Dr. deSa's point in his letter, as  
18 filed, explaining his point in this regard says,  
19 if I understand that all right, that he is not happy  
20 with the SIDS diagnosis in the Hines' case, because  
21 the toxicological findings raise another possible  
22 cause of death, which cannot be and has not been  
excluded.

23 In Volume 71, page 5651 Dr. Kauffman  
24 had this to say on the question beginning at line 22.

25





B-1

Dm/ac

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2 "He" meaning Hines:

11 And he goes on at page 56, 57, to explain what  
he meant by that and beginning at line 17:

SIDS by definition is Sudden Infant  
Death in an infant who appeared  
to be well up until the time he  
was suddenly and unexpected found  
dead for no apparent reason.  
Frequently there are no specific  
findings.

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2        " The findings reported in this  
3        report have been reported in  
4        infants who died unexpectedly  
5        and suddenly without any apparent  
6        cause and who were perceived to  
7        be in perfectly good health at  
8        the time they died.

9        As far as I am concerned if an  
10      infant has another illness or  
11      symptoms or physical findings which  
12      indicate that he is seriously  
13      ill, it by definition is not  
14      SIDS because there is another  
15      cause for the death.

16      So when this infant came in at  
17      2½ weeks of age with rather  
18      profound symptomatology everybody  
19      recognized immediately that he was  
20      seriously ill. It could be a  
21      number of different things but there  
22      was no doubt that he was ill and  
23      having trouble.

24      So that along with the findings  
25      of abnormal heart rhythm, changes  
       in heart rate and the other symptoms





B-3

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" that he had, said that something was wrong with him, he is not a baby in normal health and the fact that he died then must be related in some way to his previous illness, and as far as I am concerned cannot be defined as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.

Q. Dr. Kauffman, to make sure that I understand what you have said, are you saying that the fact of the child's illness on admission to Hospital was sufficient in your view to make a clinical diagnosis of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome inappropriate?

A. No, the fact that he had a pre-existing illness.

Q. Was there any other feature of his clinical condition or any other symptoms which he manifested during life which influenced you in reaching your conclusion in this regard?

A. I couldn't answer that more





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" specifically then I have without going through the chart again and refreshing my memory. But in general the answer to your question, it was the fact that although he arrived and was having some arrhythmias, he did appear to be relatively stable and then had a sudden arrest with findings that were compatible with digoxin intoxication from which he could not be resuscitated. And then digoxin was unexpectedly found in his tissues when he had never received the drug. And that is a summary of the factors that influenced me. "

Mr. Commissioner, if I understand Dr. Kauffman right, he appears to be challenging the SIDS explanation on two bases. First on the basis that quite apart from digoxin findings Hines was known to have a pre-existing sickness. He was a seriously ill child when he arrived at the Hospital. He appears to be saying that unless it can be demonstrated that that pre-existing illness did not have anything to do with his death, then on that basis alone SIDS is an





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2 inappropriate candidate for cause of death.

3

4 He then appears to be saying that  
5 quite apart from the pre-existing illness which would  
6 make SIDS inappropriate, there are toxicological  
7 findings of digoxin, together with symptoms of digoxin  
8 intoxication, which again unless excluded make  
9 SIDS an inappropriate cause of death.

10

11 Dr. Hastreiter in Volume 76, pages  
12 6783 to 6784 and elsewhere in his evidence, similarly  
13 challenges SIDS as a cause of death. Dr. Mirkin's  
14 evidence is to the same effect, and that is found  
15 in Volume 87, pages 8916 to 8919.

16

17 Frankly, Mr. Commissioner, and it  
18 is unfortunate, that the battle lines on the SIDS  
19 question appear to pit the physicians at the Hospital  
20 for Sick Children against the non-Hospital for Sick  
21 Children physicians.

22

23 It is my submission that in light  
24 of the manner of Jordan Hines' death and nature of  
25 his terminal symptoms; the unexpectedness of his  
death; the lack of any explanation for the death  
until the SIDS theory was raised; circumstantial  
matters such as the time of the death and the presence  
of the same nursing team; the swiftness and  
irreversibility of the decline of the child; the





B-6

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2 presence of digoxin where none was supposed to  
3 be, and none ever having been prescribed. In  
4 fact if my earlier submission be valid there was on  
5 or around the ward someone capable of administering  
6 unprescribed digoxin doses for infants; on the basis  
7 of all of that, it is my submission that you can  
8 and should find that the more probable cause of  
9 Jordan Hines' death was digoxin toxicity resulting  
10 from the administration of an unprescribed digoxin  
11 dose of an unknown size but of sufficient size to  
cause his death.

12

13 While that explanation remains  
14 plausible, there is in my submission no room for  
15 Sudden Infant Death Syndrome as the cause of death.

16

17 If that be acceptable, the remaining  
18 question is this, if Baby Hines did then die of  
19 digoxin overdose was that digoxin administered by  
20 accident or deliberately? One can't be certain of  
21 course that Baby Hines was not given another child's  
22 digoxin dose by mistake. Although that might perhaps  
23 be easier to contemplate, whether or not three other  
24 children who also received digoxin when none had been  
25 prescribed for them. The possibility that Hines  
was given digoxin inadvertently in substitution for  
a drug he was supposed to receive was canvassed with





B-7

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2 the pharmacologists.

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4 The only medications prescribed for  
5 this baby were ampicillin and gentamicin. Drs.  
6 Hastreiter, Spielberg, Mirkin, and Kauffman have  
7 all expressed the opinion that errors involving  
8 digoxin and either of those antibiotics are unlikely.  
9 Therefore in my respectful submission you are entitled  
10 to find about Jordan Hines that he probably died  
11 of digoxin intoxication resulting from the administration  
12 of an unprescribed dose and presumably excessive  
13 dose of digoxin and that there is no evidence to  
14 suggest that that administration was accidental or  
15 by mistake.

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May I move on to the case of

Stephanie Lombardo. This child died, sir, at 4:20  
in the morning on December the 23rd, 1980. She was  
ten days old. She had spent the whole of her short  
life in the Hospital having been admitted to the  
Hospital for Sick Children the day she was born.  
She had severe congenital heart disease and had under-  
gone surgery at the age of four days for a shunt  
procedure. She did quite well post-operatively and  
went from the ICU to ward 4A on December the 22nd.  
There was concern about the size of the shunt and  
she was on heparin to guard against the shunt becoming





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2 blocked by blood clots.

3 At page 41 of the chart is the  
4 note for the long night shift for the night that she  
5 died. It begins at the bottom of the page and  
6 it is Nurse Ganassin's note. It records that the  
7 baby from 7:00 in the evening until 3:30 in the  
8 morning was relatively stable. The heparin was  
9 infusing well. The baby was feeding eagerly one and  
10 a half to two ounces every three hours. Her apical  
11 heart rate was between 144 and 152 throughout that  
12 period and regular. Respirations were 50 to 52 a  
13 minute, were shallow but she was in no distress and  
14 she was pink in room air, became dusky when she was  
15 upset. She became restless after the second feed  
16 but settled well. In fact being pink in room air,  
17 as I understand the medical evidence suggests that  
18 there is reasonably good oxygenation of the blood,  
19 in other words the shunt is working. At 3:30 in  
20 the morning there is a sudden change in that picture.  
21 Nurse Ganassin notes that the baby became restless,  
22 breathing was very shallow and the apex became  
23 irregular and bradycardic.  
24

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C  
P/cr  
2 She was placed on a cardiac monitor, her colour  
3 became increasingly dusty, 100 per cent oxygen was  
4 given by mask and her extremities became cold and  
5 cyanotic. She vomited a small amount of mucus.

6 The doctor was called and a Code 25 was called.

7 Page 41 is the arrest note. I  
8 respectfully draw your attention to the sequence and  
9 pace of events. The medical resident notes that he  
10 was called at 3:30 about an irregular apex with  
11 bradycardia. His observations were that the baby  
12 was cyanode, cool extremities, weak pulses, her heart  
13 rate was irregular on the monitor, 50 to 180 with  
14 variable QRS patterns. I do not know what HS means  
15 but it was faint, no murmur heard, which rather  
16 suggests that the shunt at that stage was not working.  
17 He called a cardiology fellow and a cardiovascular  
18 surgeon and tried to get arterial gases and gave  
19 oxygen by mask.

20 At 3:40, 10 minutes after the  
21 resident arrived, the baby vomited, was suctioned.  
22 At 3:45 she went into cardiac arrest - fibrillation -  
23 CPR was started. At 3:48 the arrest team arrived  
24 and took over the resuscitation efforts and the  
25 parents and Dr. Rowe were informed. Arterial blood  
gases at 4 o'clock at those levels. The baby was





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2 incubated, defibrillation attempted. From  
3 fibrillation she went straight into a complete lack  
4 of any heart beat, they were unable to initiate  
5 any heart rate and at 4:20 in the morning the  
6 resuscitation efforts stopped.

7 At 3:30 Stephanie Lombardo went into  
8 a sudden and terribly steep decline. It was thought  
9 at the time that her shunt had closed down and if  
10 that were the case her death was entirely consistent  
11 with her clinical picture. I suggest, too, that  
12 sudden occlusion of the shunt had led to her death  
13 could not have been confirmed or rejected unhappily  
14 because her parents would not consent to an autopsy.

15 Fairly there was no reason for the  
16 position of the Hospital to doubt that explanation of  
17 the death. It had been known that the shunt was not  
18 large. The fact that the child was receiving heparin  
19 is indicative of the physician's recognition of the  
20 danger of the shunt occluding. There was a  
21 note in the chart, the resident's note, that when  
22 he was called to see the child at 3:30 in the morning  
23 no murmur was heard. It appeared that a satisfactory  
24 explanation had been provided for her death.

25 Fourteen months later her body was  
26 exhumed and an autopsy was performed on the body.  
27 Unhappily we do not know whether it was at that stage





Lamek (Argument)

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2 possible to determine the status of the shunt or whether  
3 that investigation was ever made. Tissue samples were  
4 taken for digoxin. Digoxin had never been prescribed  
5 for Stephanie Lombardo and her exhumed tissues, heart,  
6 liver, lungs, stomach, showed high concentrations of  
7 digoxin as set out in Exhibit 95, and I will summarize  
8 them for you, sir. These are all measurements of  
9 digoxin, that is RIA and HPLC: in the centre of the  
10 heart, 677 nanograms per gram; in the left ventricle,  
11 487 nanograms per gram; in the liver, 354 nanograms  
12 per gram; in the lung, 289 nanograms per gram and  
13 the stomach contents sample, in the average of 629  
14 nanograms per gram.

15

16 Mr. Commissioner, I do not cite those  
17 numbers to give them credibility as absolute numbers.  
18 Clearly they have none as absolute numbers in any  
19 way indicating the concentration at the time of  
20 death. But at least one of the pharmacologists and  
21 one of the cardiologists have been prepared to pay  
22 some attention to the order of those numbers as I  
23 shall say in a moment.

24

25 With the results of the digoxin  
assays of the tissues of Baby Lombardo clearly an  
entirely new and very different cause of death  
became possible. The baby should have had no digoxin





1       in her body. In fact she had digoxin at levels which  
2       might suggest that she had had a substantial amount  
3       at the time of her death.

4                   Just as all physicians had agreed that  
5       Stephanie Lombardo's death was consistent with her  
6       clinical condition and with the hypothesis that her  
7       shunt had occluded so now they all had to agree that  
8       her death, her manner of dying and her terminal  
9       symptoms were also consistent with digoxin intoxication.  
10      Clearly the child had received digoxin during her  
11     life. Equally clearly she was not supposed to have  
12     received it. But the same problems of interpretation  
13     seem to apply here as they did in the Hines' case.  
14     The difficulty is to know when the child received  
15     digoxin, how much digoxin she received and the  
16     circumstances of her receiving it.

17                  As to the amount of digoxin that she  
18     received, Dr. Hastreiter in Volume 76 at page 6787  
19     said this in the course of his direct examination.  
20     The numbers reported by Mr. Cimbura's lab had been  
21     recited to him. The question at the top of page  
22     6787:

23                  "Now, you gave evidence at the  
24     preliminary inquiry, Dr. Hastreiter,  
25     as to the significance of those  
      findings, and that evidence is found





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2                   "in Volume 34 at page 16; I won't take  
3                   the time to read that but I hope I  
4                   summarize it correctly. It was your  
5                   view that if the chest fluid in which  
6                   concentration of 225 nanograms per  
7                   millilitre was measured, if the chest  
8                   fluid were blood it would certainly  
9                   indicate in your mind digoxin poison-  
10                  ing. You didn't know what that fluid  
11                  really was and it could be contaminated  
12                  by stomach contents you said, you  
13                  didn't know what it could be?

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A.               Right.

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Q .               You then referred to the  
recorded tissue concentrations which  
clearly was also very high and which  
at that had they been measured in fresh  
tissue would be strongly suggestive of  
poisoning.

On the other hand, you recognized in  
your evidence that dehydration or  
desiccation of the tissues may have  
served to elevate the digoxin  
concentrations, but you were still  
inclined to regard the digoxin levels





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2                   "in the exhumed tissues as pointing  
3                   to the probability that the child had  
4                   received an overdose of digoxin, but  
5                   you couldn't, you said, arrive at that  
6                   conclusion with any absolute certainty?

7                   A.         Correct.

8                   Q.         Have I reasonably summarized  
9                   what you recall your evidence to have  
                 been?

10                  A.         Right.

11                  Q.         Are you still of those same  
12                  views with respect to the toxicological  
13                  data in the case of Stephanie Lombardo?

14                  A.         Yes. I had some reservations  
15                  about the source, the quality of that  
                 fluid.

16                  Q.         Yes.

17                  A.         And what it was, whether it was  
18                  contaminated or not. I was concerned  
19                  about our lack of experience with  
                 exhumed tissues, and the fact that  
20                  possibly dehydration or drying of  
                 the tissues could have concentrated  
21                  digoxin and made it appear higher than  
22                  it actually was. However, it would be

24

25





1                     "very, very difficult to explain, even  
2 if his levels were within a therapeutic  
3 range, you know, why would they be  
4 there when this child was not  
5 prescribed digoxin. Not only that,  
6 but if the child had accidentally  
7 received one dose of digoxin you would  
8 not expect to have even therapeutic  
9 levels in the tissues, and certainly  
10 not in fluid if it were blood, and of  
11 course we don't know exactly about that.  
12 This was the source of my reservation,  
13 otherwise there would be very little  
14 doubt that there would be 'probable  
murder'.

15 Q.                 But I take it the one clear  
16 thing about the findings of digoxin  
17 by HPLC and RIA in the tissues of this  
18 child is that digoxin was found at all,  
19 that is the truly significant thing  
about the findings is it not?

20 A.                 I think more than that, perhaps  
21 the fact that these levels are really  
22 quite high, you know. I think all  
23 levels are considerably above what one  
would consider normal therapeutic range  
24 in these tissues."





D-1

RD/ac

1

2 " Of course, as I say we don't have  
3 a lot of experience with exhumed  
4 bodies and it is difficult to  
5 interpret these values.

6

7 Q. Is there any question in your  
8 mind, however, Dr. Hastreiter, but  
9 that this child received one or  
more unprescribed doses of digoxin?

10

A. No question at all.

11

12 Q. And you have to some extent  
13 on the basis of the levels recorded  
here, I suggest you have expressed  
a very qualified opinion on the  
14 quantitative significance of those  
findings, have you not?

15

A. Yes.

16

17 Q. Not within any range of  
precision but you have said they  
18 are very high. They are higher  
than you would expect to find in  
the case of one mistaken dose having  
been delivered to the child?

21

A. Definitely.

22

23 Q. And I take it they gave you  
cause for concern as to the likelihood

24

25





1

2                   " of digoxin having been involved  
3                   in this child's death?

4                   A. Yes. "

5                  Then turning over to page 6791, Mr. Commissioner,  
6                  at line 3:

7                  " MR. LAMEK: Q. You have said  
8                  Dr. Hastreiter that the levels  
9                  recorded in these exhumed tissues  
10                 were greater than you would expect  
11                 to see had this child received  
12                 by error the normal maintenance dose  
13                 I assume maintenance dose of  
14                 digoxin. Was that your meaning?

15                 A. Right.

16                 Q. Now that rather implies as my  
17                 learned friend Mr. Scott says that  
18                 you might have had some expectation  
19                 as to the levels you would find  
20                 had the child received a normal  
21                 maintenance dose in error. Can you  
22                 give us an idea what you might have  
23                 expected to find had the child  
24                 received a normal maintenance dose  
25                 by error?

26                 A. I think first of all one should





D-3

1

" understand that the ordinary child that  
is treated with digoxin is not  
treated with one maintenance dose.  
The child is usually loaded with  
the medication first, so-called  
digitalization, and then maintained  
on the drug.

8

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17

If you were to give a child let's  
say you take any baby and give the  
baby one maintenance dose of the  
drug without any previous loading,  
your blood level would be very low;  
your tissue levels would be  
extremely low, and there is no way  
that you would expect even if you  
had severe dehydration or crying  
of these tissues ... "

That may be drying of these tissues.

18

19

20

21

22

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25

" ... to have such a high concentration  
in the tissue. So I can't tell you  
the exact figures.

I would expect if this was a fresh  
body, fresh specimen I could tell  
you but being exhumed and being  
possibly dry, dehydrated, I just





1

" simply don't know.

2

I know that the magnitude is such that  
I have very little doubt about the  
fact that this was not a maintenance  
dose.

3

Q. Doctor, could we come at it  
perhaps another way. If these  
levels had been recorded in fresh  
tissue would they have been  
consistent with the concentrations  
that you would expect to see in a  
child who had been receiving  
digoxin on a regular ongoing way  
as part of a regime of therapeutic  
administration?

4

A. No. They are much higher.

5

Q. They would have been higher  
even than that?

6

A. These levels are much higher  
than they would have been in fresh  
tissue in a child who had been  
receiving a therapeutic regime of  
the drug, yes. "

7

Dr. Hastreiter was pretty clearly of the view that,  
despite all the lack of experience and the difficulty

8

9





D-5

1

2 of interpreting levels in exhumed tissue, was  
3 satisfied that the order of magnitude of these  
4 numbers could not be ignored and the order of  
5 magnitude of the numbers satisfied him that they  
6 did not result from the accidental or erroneous  
7 administration of one dose to the child.

8

9 Dr. Kauffman was not willing to  
10 attach significance to the numbers, although he did  
11 acknowledge in Volume 71, page 5580 that they were  
12 "fairly high".

13

14 He was impressed by the established  
15 presence of digoxin in a child for whose death  
16 an unconfirmed cause of shunt occlusion had previously  
17 been assigned, but who had displayed symptoms of  
18 digoxin toxicity and who had had a high serum  
19 potassium level, which was also, to his mind,  
20 suggestive of digoxin toxicity.

21

22 In other words, Dr. Kauffman, although  
23 he recognized that the occluded shunt explanation may  
24 well have explained the death, in the absence of  
25 any other information that could be accepted as an  
explanation of the death, still left him with some  
question of, first, the symptoms of digoxin toxicity  
that the child manifested in the course of her terminal





1

2 events, but also that other thing which he regarded  
3 as symptomatic of digoxin toxicity, an elevated  
4 serum potassium level.

5 As between the two possible explanations  
6 of Stephanie Lombardo's death, Dr. Kauffman preferred  
7 the one, digoxin intoxication, for which, in his  
8 view, there was objective evidence, that is to say  
9 the presence of digoxin where there should have been  
none.

10 That explanation did have the benefit  
11 of objective evidence, considered the other, the  
12 occluded shunt explanation was an explanation for  
13 which there was no objective evidence.

14 That view of Dr. Kauffman, sir,  
15 is found at Volume 71, page 5581.

16 Again, Mr. Commissioner, putting that  
17 reasoning which I may say so has an attractive practicality  
18 about it, putting that reasoning together with  
19 everything that we know about this child, the events  
20 leading to her death and the circumstances on the  
21 ward surrounding her death, putting that all together  
22 suggests that here too, you may properly find that  
23 Stephanie Lombardo died of digoxin toxicity, resulting  
from her having received an unprescribed, and if you  
are prepared to accept Dr. Hastreiter's opinion,

24

25





1

2 excessive dose of digoxin.

3 As to whether any such dose was  
4 administered deliberately or by accident or by  
5 error, it should first be noted that the only  
6 medication prescribed for Baby Lombardo was heparin.  
7 It has been suggested rather tepidly, I think, has  
8 been suggested once or twice that there may have  
been a mixup between heparin and digoxin.

9 Nurse Ganassin, and she gave evidence,  
10 and her evidence on this point is found at Volume 140,  
11 pages 2360 to 2365, Nurse Ganassin agreed that was  
12 unlikely, particularly considering the string of  
13 mistakes that would have to be made to produce the  
14 error and Dr. McGee, when advised of the evidence  
15 as to the lack of fuss and bustle on the ward that  
16 night, the night Baby Lombardo died, agreed that  
17 given the low stress level, the sequence of errors  
18 at the time that had to be involved would not be  
19 likely. That evidence, sir, is found in Volume 146,  
pages 3646 to 7.

20 There is then, in my submission, no  
evidence to suggest that there was any error or  
21 accident to explain Baby Lombardo's having received  
22 digoxin.

23 I then come to Baby Belanger, the  
24  
25





D-8

1

2 last of the group of children for whom digoxin  
3 was not prescribed, but for whom was found.

4 Jesse Belanger is the first child  
5 on the list so far who did not go into his final  
6 decline in the middle of the night. He got into  
7 trouble at the end of the long dayshift on December  
8 28th, 1980, and he died at 8:16 that evening. The  
9 Traynor nursing team worked the long dayshift on  
December 28th.

10 Baby Belanger was six weeks old.

11 He had been admitted to the Hospital for Sick  
12 Children at two days of age on November 19th, 1980.  
13 His status on administration is summarized by  
14 Dr. Freedom in his reporting letter to the referring  
physician. It is found at page 10 of the chart.  
15 Perhaps I can read it. He quotes:

16 " As you know, I catheterized this  
17 infant on the 20th of November, 1980  
18 in order to clarify the complex  
congenital cardiac malformations.

19 As you know, we were both concerned  
20 that this infant may have a serious,  
21 potentially lethal underlying  
chromosome abnormality but we do  
22 feel it important to establish the  
23

24

25





D-9

1

2 " cardiac diagnosis.

3

The catheter study was performed  
uneventfully on the morning of  
November 20th, 1980. In brief

5

this revealed the aorta was  
reasonably saturated at 93% and  
the angiography revealed a single

6

left ventricle with an outlet

7

chamber and normally connected

8

great arteries. There was valve

9

and subvalve pulmonary stenosis

10

with mild to moderate hypoplasia  
of the main and branch pulmonary  
arteries. There is definitely

11

a common atrioventricular orifice

12

that seems connected primarily

13

to the left ventricle and the

14

right ventricle is represented by

15

an outlet chamber that supports

16

the pulmonary valve and artery.

17

There is evidence of an atrial

18

septal defect. There is also a

19

right-sided aortic arch with an

20

abberant left subclavian artery.

21

In summary then, this infant has

22

23

24

25





D-11

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2 There is concern about other  
3 problems, genetic problems. There are suspected  
4 chromosomal anomalies, although later those fears  
5 prove to be groundless and from page 26 of the chart  
6 it appears that the child was chromosomally normal.

7 Jesse Belanger's course in his  
8 first two or three weeks in the Hospital is characterized,  
9 I suggest, by stable, vital signs with increasing  
10 syanosis. By the end of November, as appears from  
11 page 44 of the chart: hypothermia has been noted  
12 and having trouble maintaining his temperature.  
13 The oxygen saturation of the blood is declining and  
14 also on page 44 by December 3rd -- I'm sorry, page  
15 45. By December 3rd, PO2 is as low as 21 and at the  
16 bottom of the page, note appears:

17 " This PO2 can't be doing his  
18 brain much good. Perhaps we should  
19 discuss early shunt provision with  
20 cardiologists rather than wait  
21 for further genetic analysis and  
22 will discuss in the morning. "

23 So there is now concern about oxygenation of the  
24 blood, the effect that that might be having on  
25 his general state, in particular on his brain.

On December 4th, page 49 of the chart





D-10

1

" complex congenital heart disease  
and at the present time, is quite  
nicely balanced with a significant  
degree of valve and subvalve  
pulmonary stenosis. Despite this  
however, his saturation is excellent.  
At the present time, there is no  
need for surgical intervention,  
but if his karyotype proves normal  
and if in time he would develop  
increasing pulmonary outflow tract  
obstruction (which I think quite  
likely) then he would be a candidate  
for some form of systemic to pulmonary  
artery shunt.

15

At the present time, this baby is  
not in heart failure, requires no  
cardiac medications and I think a  
lot rides on the chromosome  
analysis. "

16

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You have got a child with complex congenital heart  
disease, clearly. Despite all of that apparently  
good oxygenation, no immediate need for surgery. He  
is not then in congestive heart failure and he doesn't  
need any cardiac medications.





D-12

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2 Dr. Rowe wrote a note:

3 " The signs suggest that infundibula  
4 pulmonary stenosis may have become  
5 more significant, ie. T/F like  
6 physiology. In the event of progressive  
7 hypoxic signs propanolol would  
8 be a reasonable therapy on trial.

9 A shunt is a likely later need. "

10 It was becoming pretty clear that this child was  
11 going to be a candidate for surgery. The position  
12 appeared to be deteriorating, but still no sign  
13 of enormous urgency. People were not yet talking  
14 about surgery tomorrow to get this thing fixed up.

15 During the first two weeks of  
16 December the baby continued to have stable vital  
17 signs, but again increasing syanosis and appears from  
18 pages 52 to 53 of the chart.

19 On December 20, 1980, Dr. Rowe's  
20 note on page 55, a decision is made to operate.

21 At the top of the page on 55:  
22 " This baby is after discussion with  
23 the ... "

24 I'm not sure who that is in the family.

25 " ... to undergo an aorta pulmonary  
shunt and at present this is planned





D-13

1

2 " for 21/12/80. I have spoken to  
3 the parents about surgery as has  
4 Dr. Freedom. Dr. ... "

5 Somebody.

6

" ... and the surgical representatives. "

7 A decision is then made as of December 20th to take  
8 this child to surgery December 21st. You have to  
9 go right back to the beginning of the chart, page 8,  
10 to see Dr. Williams' reporting letter to Dr. Freedom  
on that surgery.

11

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E/DM/ko 2

There are a couple of things of significance in the  
letter, in the first paragraph:

4

"I operated on this baby on December  
22nd to palliate his congenital heart  
defect. He has infundibular stenosis  
with VSD and likely an A-V canal.

5

There was also some concern about  
the size of the right ventricle, so  
that he may never be suitable for  
total repair."

6

7

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12

He goes on to describe other anomalies in the child's  
heart and vascular system.

13

14

In the second paragraph there is concern  
expressed about the size of the shunt, about two-  
thirds of the way through the paragraph:

15

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"On opening the shunt there was a  
rather modest thrill over the  
pulmonary artery and I was dis-  
appointed the artery was as long as  
it was. It measured about 18 mm in  
length and 3½-4 mm in diameter. The  
positioning of the shunt seemed ideal  
but I am concerned that it is a bit  
small."

And in that third paragraph he reports





1

E 2

2 on the post-operative status of the child:

3 "Post-operatively he has been stable  
4 and his saturation has been hovering  
5 about 70% to 80%. His chest X-ray  
6 this morning shows definite  
7 increased vascularity on the left  
8 but we are still watching him as to  
9 whether his shunt is sufficiently  
10 large.. I think that if there is  
11 much further question about it we  
12 should probably reoperate on him and  
13 do a central shunt."

14 So already the surgeon recognizes the  
15 possible problem with the surgery that has been  
16 performed, and recognizes the very real possibility  
17 that further surgery may be required.

18 On December 26th the child is  
19 transferred from the ICU to 7G, it appears there was a  
20 shortage of space in the ICU and with Dr. Rowe's  
21 blessing, no doubt reluctantly given, the child went to  
22 7G from the ICU and at that stage he had a collapsed  
23 left lung.

24 On December 28th he went from 7G to  
25 Ward 4B in the early afternoon. The nursing note by  
Nurse Reaper at page 64 of the chart is of some interest





1

E 3      2 in following the child's progress. The top of the page  
3            it goes from 1 o'clock until 7 o'clock in the evening  
4            and she reports:

5            "Child stable during afternoon apex  
6            134 to 170 and regular. D tube fed  
7            at 1400 and retained. Suctioned for  
8            moderate amount of white mucus. Colour  
9            remained pink.

10          1830 - apex noted to be irregular, colour  
11          somewhat dusky. Respirations up to  
12          80 and very shallow. D tube feeding  
13          in progress, position checked twice.  
14          Suctioned orally for moderate amount  
15          white mucus. Colour extremely poor.  
16          Doctor notified and present. Apex  
17          dropped and cardiac arrest called."

18          From the time of the transfer to the  
19          fourth floor Baby Belanger from a review of the  
20          physician's orders and medication sheet does not  
21          appear to have been on any medications, he had never  
22          been on digoxin.

23          At autopsy, as appears from page 22 of  
24          the chart the shunt was found to be patent.

25          Most of the physicians from whom we have  
26          heard considered Baby Belanger's death to be consistent





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E 4      2 with his clinical condition. Dr. Hastreiter gave him  
3 a severity rating of 8. Dr. Kauffman considered that  
4 the baby by virtue of his cardiac condition was at a  
5 high risk of dying, and indeed was predisposed to a  
6 sudden deterioration. In my submission the  
7 deterioration recorded on the day of this child's death  
could reasonably be described as a sudden deterioration.

8                 Now again, many months later, Baby  
9 Belanger's body was exhumed. The tissues were taken at  
10 autopsy of that exhumed body and it was sent to  
11 Mr. Cimbura at the Centre of Forensic Sciences for  
12 digoxin analysis. The results are set out in Exhibit  
13 95E at pages 2 to 3 and they disclose that in the  
14 exhumed liver sample there was a concentration of 253  
15 nanograms per gram of digoxin, that is to say after an  
16 analysis by HPLC/RIA, and after the same kind of  
17 analysis a concentration of 43 nanograms per gram in  
muscle tissue.

18                 You will recall, sir, that Belanger was  
19 one of the two children where identification of digoxin  
20 was confirmed by gas chromatography and mass spectrometry.  
21 In recognizing all of the difficulties of interpreting  
22 levels found in exhumed tissue I note merely that the  
23 liver concentration recorded in this child is above the  
levels recorded in fresh livers of infants on digoxin .  
24  
25





1

E 5 2 therapy.

3 Now clearly those toxicological findings  
4 again raised a whole new set of questions about Baby  
5 Belanger. First and foremost was it the digoxin that  
6 caused his death? Everyone agrees here as with  
7 Lombardo that the death and the manner of dying of this  
child were consistent with digoxin intoxication.

8 Dr. Kauffman's evidence found at Volume  
9 71, page 5622; Dr. Kauffman considered the terminal  
10 events described in the chart to be more consistent  
11 with digoxin intoxication than with the baby's clinical  
12 condition, but again the question is whether digoxin  
13 intoxication caused the child's death and the elements  
14 that in my submission go into that determination are  
these:

15 Digoxin was found where none should  
16 have been found and I suggest it is a reasonable  
17 inference that digoxin found its way into that child's  
18 body by being administered to him during life, no other  
19 explanation has been offered by anyone.

20 Second, although the only sure signifi-  
cance of the digoxin finding is qualitative it has to  
21 be asked, I suggest, whether anything can be taken  
22 quantitatively from the recorded levels, one of which is  
23 in the toxic range of concentrations for fresh tissue.

24

25





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E 6

2 Now Dr. Hastreiter considered the  
3 toxicologic data along with the clinical data and  
4 concluded that digoxin toxicity was probably the cause  
5 of death. He did not believe that the digoxin  
6 concentrations of the order reported could be produced  
7 by a single maintenance dose, or even a single loading  
8 dose given in error. He also considered the sudden  
9 and in his view unexpected nature of the terminal  
10 events, and he concluded that Baby Belanger probably  
11 died of digoxin intoxication resulting from a  
12 deliberately administered overdose of the drug. That  
13 evidence, sir, is found at Volume 77, pages 6798 to  
14 6809.

15 Dr. Kauffman, although he acknowledges  
16 that digoxin toxicity was not and could not be proved,  
17 gave us his opinion that there was a high probability  
18 of digoxin toxicity and that digoxin at least  
19 contributed to Baby Belanger's death and he thought it  
unlikely that the death had been caused by a medication  
error. That is found in Volume 73, pages 6068 to 6069.

20 In my submission in order to make those  
21 statements Dr. Kauffman must, to some extent at least  
22 be attaching some significance to the quantitative  
23 findings, not merely to the qualitative findings.

24 In summary, Mr. Commissioner, you have a  
25





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2

E 7 child here who died in the early evening having gone  
3 into sudden decline in the presence of members of a  
4 particular nursing team. Who although very sick with  
5 a not good prognosis may not have been expected to die  
6 just when he did. A child for whose sudden death there  
7 is no immediate clinical explanation, other than the  
proposition that his cardiac status put him at risk  
8 of death and could have caused him to deteriorate and  
9 die suddenly. Certainly, however, death was not the  
10 result of a sudden occlusion of his shunt. We have a  
11 baby whose terminal symptoms are consistent with his  
12 clinical status and are also consistent, or in  
13 Dr. Kauffman's view more consistent with digoxin  
14 toxicity, we have a child in whose exhumed body digoxin  
15 was found in concentrations which were they in fresh  
16 tissue would be indicative of toxicity, although this  
was a child for whom the drug was never prescribed.

17

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In all of the circumstances, in my  
submission, you are entitled to infer and find that  
Jesse Belanger probably died of digoxin toxicity  
resulting from the unprescribed administration of  
digoxin in a toxic sized dose and that there is no  
evidence to suggest and Drs. Hastreiter, Mirkin and  
Kauffman think it unlikely that digoxin was  
administered to this baby by error.





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E 8

Now Mr. Commissioner, those are the three other children then for whom digoxin was not prescribed but in whom it was found and I have made the same submission with respect to each of them to you.

As I told you, I want to move now to that group of five patients in respect of whom "Do not resuscitate" orders were written. I propose to do that really for two reasons. First, although as I said on Thursday every case has to be reviewed to see if there are events or circumstances which excite suspicion, and the severity of a child's condition or the obliqueness of his prognosis don't by any means guarantee that his death when it occurred was a natural one. It has nevertheless to be acknowledged that the hopelessly and clearly terminally sick child is likely in the circumstances of our situation to be found to have died a natural death. I say that because for so many of these children there is no clear toxicological evidence, but when there is clear compelling compatibility between the death and the irreversible clinical condition it is very difficult to suggest that something other than clinical condition may have caused the death.

If there was a killer on the cardiology wards, as in my submission there was, then a review of





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E 9

2 all of the cases that we have to consider does not  
3 suggest that children were selected for death because  
4 they were terminally ill. Certainly some of the  
5 children about whom I have already made submissions  
6 and some of those about whom I shall be making  
7 submissions, were extremely sick. But it is difficult  
8 to explain rationally why perhaps a misplaced  
9 tenderness for such children and the desire that they  
10 not suffer further would lead anyone to kill, for  
11 example, Justin Cook on the eve of surgery which might  
12 have saved him. Other children whose deaths I will  
13 suggest would have been at least highly suspicious,  
14 were far from hopelessly sick. Baby Velasquez, for  
15 example, was recovering from surgery and was expected  
16 to be sent home in the near future. In short, if one  
17 is entitled to consider whether a motive existed as an  
18 aid to determine how children died, it is my submission  
19 that mercy killing or euthanasia is not a strong  
20 candidate. Indeed it would be my submission that none  
21 of those children who were so mortally sick that no  
22 resuscitation effort was to be made, none of them died  
23 in circumstances to give rise to suspicion. That  
24 indeed if it be so may be significant. For some  
25 reason, if I am correct, those for whom a Code 25 was  
not to be called, although exhypothesis they were





1

E 10      2 therefore desperately and terminally ill, those for  
3 whom a Code 25 was not to be called appear not to have  
4 attracted the attention of whomever it was, according  
5 to my thesis, who was deliberately administering over-  
6 doses of digoxin to children.

7

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F-1

DP/ac

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You will recall, sir, that three of the "do not resuscitate" patients were older children and for them their age and ability to relate what someone had done would no doubt militate against any interference with them. But two were infants and it would be my submission that they too died natural deaths.

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My second reason for turning to this group of patients at this point in my submission is to consider the manner of their dying and to compare and contrast it with the way in which so many of the other children died. Just as other patterns and common threads, each in and of itself ambiguous, may when taken in the round assume a significance that would be helpful to you, so too, I suggest, are the repeated pattern of death and terminal symptoms although ambiguous if considered alone may add to the composite picture that you have to have of these children.

I will deal with the group if I may in chronological order of their deaths.

THE COMMISSIONER: I understand that Murphy, Floryn and Heyworth are the three older children.

MR. LAMEK: We have Perreault, Murphy,





F-2

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2 Heyworth, and Leith and Perreault and Leith were  
3 the infants.

4 Alan Perreault died at 1:45 in the  
5 afternoon of July 8th on ward 4A. The Trayner team  
6 was on duty. Indeed we have heard from Mrs. Trayner  
7 that this baby died in her arms. Baby Perreault  
8 had that congenital heart defect known as  
hypoplastic left heart syndrome.

9 In Volume 12 beginning at page 2088,  
10 Dr. Rowe discussed the baby's heart defect and  
11 told us that babies with that particular syndrome  
12 died at an average age of 4½ days as soon as the  
ductus arteriosis closes. They are dependent upon  
the ductus for getting the blood to the lungs.  
14 He says that only in exceptional cases do babies with  
15 this condition live much longer than a week. Beyond  
16 question, Alan Perreault was not going to survive.  
17 The amazing thing about him was that he lived for  
18 26 or 27 days. Nothing could be done for him although  
19 so surprising was his survival that the cardiologists  
20 went back to be sure of their diagnosis and they  
21 even contemplated the possibility of experimental  
heroic surgery before he at last died. His course  
22 is summed up in the death report at page 30 of the  
chart. It says that he was referred from the North

24

25





F-3

1

2 York Hospital at the age of 12 days and he had  
3 gross congestive heart failure. He was dusky,  
4 had a fast respiratory rate, an enlarged liver,  
5 poor peripheral pulses, gallop rhythm, soft systolic  
6 murmur. It cites the investigations that were done  
and then:

7 " In view of the diagnosis of  
8 hypoplastic left heart and its  
9 inevitably poor outcome, no active  
10 medical treatment was undertaken  
11 with full consent of both parents.  
12 The baby gradually deteriorated  
13 and died at 1345 hours on 8.7.80.  
14 A limited post mortem examination  
15 of heart and lungs will be  
performed. "

16 The baby's course from July 5th to July 8th as  
17 it appears in the nurses' and physicians' notes in  
18 the chart beginning at page 40 and following, is  
19 I suggest one of ongoing deterioration. Respirations  
20 were slowly and progressively becoming more difficult  
21 for this child. There are signs of worsening  
22 congestive heart failure with increasingly puffy feet  
23 and extremities. His colour is worsening as the  
days go by. He developed a gallop heart rhythm -

24

25





1

2 becomes more frequent.

3

4 By the long dayshift of July 8th,  
5 it was expected, according to Mrs. Trayner, that  
6 he would die that day. That is in her evidence  
7 in Volume 137, page 1501. She says that they  
8 were told by the physicians to expect the baby  
9 to die that day.

10

11 Dr. Rowe in reviewing the events  
12 leading to the child's death said this at Volume  
13 12, page 2099, beginning at line 10, in direct  
14 examination by me:

15

16 " Q. Doctor, I have to put to you  
17 that that death is in very sharp  
18 contrast to the sequences that  
19 we were referring repeatedly  
20 yesterday, was it not?

21

A. Yes.

22

23 Q. Now, here was a baby who was  
24 certainly very seriously sick,  
25 and inevitably would die as you  
have said. I asked you yesterday  
whether the pattern of terminal  
events that we were seeing was  
common, and I don't suggest for a  
moment that one can base anything





1

2                   " upon this one child, but nevertheless  
3                   here is one baby who certainly  
4                   fits the bill of a very, very sick  
5                   child. The manner of his death  
6                   was entirely, entirely different  
7                   from anything that we have looked  
8                   at so far. Is that a matter of  
9                   any significance in the exercise  
10                  on which we are engaged, Doctor?

11                 A. No, I don't believe so. He  
12                 had been in - despite the suggestion  
13                 that he had been stable, he had  
14                 been in chronic congestive failure.  
15                 The huge surprise of course had been  
16                 that he hadn't died before.

17                 Q. Yes.

18                 A. That he had signs of gallop  
19                 rhythm and bad congestive failure,  
20                 his liver was six centimetres  
21                 below the custom margin so he was  
22                 obviously getting worse.

23                 Q. Yes.

24                 A. Getting worse over time so  
25                 his condition was really not stable.  
I think if you compare the notes from





F-6

1

2 " the 5th of July to the 7th and  
3 they are written by a cardiologist,  
4 the notes I am referring, there  
5 is a change.

6 Q. I don't suggest he was stable,  
7 Doctor, indeed the pattern is one  
8 of slow and steady decline.

9 A. Deterioration.

10 Q. Until fatal entirely.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. In very sharp contrast to what  
13 we were seeing yesterday. That  
14 is quite often a pattern of stability  
15 and then a very sudden and rapid  
16 decline with dramatic terminal event.

17 A. Yes. "

18 Dr. Rowe agreed that there was no evidence of any  
19 arrhythmia here although he assumed that Baby  
20 Perreault's heart probably slowed before he actually died.  
21 In terms of arrhythmia he agreed that there was no  
22 evidence in the chart to suggest any rhythm disturbance  
23 as we have seen in other cases, no suggestion of  
24 any seizure activity or anything dramatic of that kind. He  
25 did suggest that there was some event that occurred  
when the baby began to exhibit Cheyne Stokes breathing





1

2 and the rate of deterioration increased.

3

4 Mrs. Trayner who was present at  
beginning at line 20:

5

" Q. Forgive me, I have no doubt  
it is still a very unpleasant  
memory. Can you describe for  
me what happened with this child?

9

10 Did he - can I put it this way, as  
between extremes, did he sort of  
11 drift away or did he suddenly  
die?

12

13 A. Well, to use your words, he  
drifted.

14

15 Q. Those are very imprecise words  
I understand, but you catch the  
16 meaning, the distinction I am  
trying to draw?

17

18 A. Yes.

19

20 Q. When you say he was dying, you  
are conjuring up a picture that  
21 we have of someone dying, sort of  
getting weaker and fainter and  
fainter and finally dying.

22

23 A. Right.

24

25





1

2 " Q. And is that your recollection  
3 of what happened with this child?

4 A. Yes, it was. "

5 There were no recorded symptoms  
6 of digoxin toxicity with Alan Perreault. The nurse  
7 who was there holding the child as he died agreed  
8 that there was no dramatic event about his death,  
9 the child drifted away. Every physician who opined  
10 in this death said that the death was entirely  
11 consistent with the severe clinical condition of  
12 the baby. Dr. Hastreiter scored him 10 on the  
13 severity rating - the most severe rating. Every  
14 physician said that there was nothing about the  
15 death that was indicative of digoxin intoxication.  
Everyone expressed the opinion that the death was  
a natural death.

16 In my submission there is nothing  
17 either in the objective evidence or in the medical  
18 opinion evidence to suggest that there was anything  
19 suspicious about the death of Alan Perreault.

20 - - - - -  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25





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2 G ---On resuming.

3 DD/cr THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Lamek.

4 MR. LAMEK: The next child in  
5 chronological sequence of those for whom there was  
6 a DNR order was Paul Murphy. He died at 10:25 in  
7 the evening on August 23rd, on Ward 4A. Mrs. Trayner's  
team was on duty.

8 This was a 15 year old boy, sir, who  
9 spent his life in and out of the Hospital for Sick  
10 Children and by the summer of 1980 sadly he was  
11 clearly dying.

12 At page 324 of the chart, Dr. Fowler's  
13 letter of July 16, 1980 to his referring physician,  
14 Dr. Dennis in Brampton. He had seen Paul Murphy  
15 on July 15th, the day before for re-assessment. He  
16 recites the history there following of this boy.: The  
second sentence of the first paragraph:

17 "He has had surgery but a haemodynamic  
18 study post-operatively explained his  
19 persistent intractible heart failure  
20 on the basis of a very small  
21 pulmonary arteries with a poor  
22 functioning right ventricle.

23 He was admitted to Hospital about  
24 three weeks ago with a severe

25





1  
2 "electrolyte problem and mental  
3 confusion. When he had his electrolytes  
4 stabilized he returned to his usual  
5 mental status and was eventually sent  
6 home about a week ago. Since that time he  
7 has been vomiting . 2-3 : times a  
8 day, except for the most recent week-  
9 end when he did not vomit. In the  
10 last two days, however, he has been  
11 vomiting again and the parents have  
12 noted intermittent mental confusion.  
13 He has been mildly cyanosed and there  
14 has been a moderate degree of swelling  
15 of his ankles, particularly in the  
16 evening."

17 Plainly the congestive heart failure, which had  
18 plagued this boy for years, was becoming progressively  
19 worse.

20 Then "Conclusions and Recommendations"  
21 at the bottom of the page:

22 "On the basis of this assessment I  
23 feel that this boy is again having a  
24 lot of difficulty because of his  
25 severe intractible heart failure,  
secondary right ventricular disease





1

"and small pulmonary arteries. He  
was discharged on digoxin and  
Hydrodiuril... Because of the gravity  
of the situation I felt that he should  
be admitted for further stabilization.  
He was intermittently rather confused  
during my examination, but most of the  
time was lucid.

This boy is remarkable in that he seems  
to come around after his many  
difficulties. I feel that he probably  
is not going to survive long, but I  
am sure we can make him more comfort-  
able by changing his diuretic regimen  
and increasing his serum potassium  
level."

On September 12th at page 17 of the chart Dr. Fowler  
wrote again to Dr. Dennis following the boy's death:

"This boy was admitted to Hospital for  
adjustment of his medications and  
died.

I am sorry about the outcome but I  
think in the last few months it was  
inevitable that he would not survive  
because of his high pulmonary pressure

24

25





1

2 "and poor right ventricular function."

3

Plainly, by the summer of 1980 this child, young man,  
had progressive and irreversible congestive heart  
failure and was not expected to survive.

4

Over the last couple of days of his  
life there are described in the nursing note,  
particularly at page 127 to 131 of the chart:

5

"Symptoms were becoming more marked  
and there was a generalized swelling  
and puffiness indicating retention of  
fluids. He was dis-oriented and he was  
having difficulty breathing. He was  
appearing drowsy. His mother was  
noticing behavioural changes."

6

When we come to page 131 of the chart there is a final  
nursing note from Miss Cooney:

7

"1930 to 2200, vital signs - stable.  
Behaviour - orientated lapsing into  
confusion in later evening. Taking  
sips of water, requesting oxygen off and  
on. 2200 - patient sitting up in bed -  
very confused. 2210 - patient in-  
voluntary of stool.

8

2215 - patient rolled down and turned  
to side - then became unresponsive -

9

10





1

"respiration at this time very shallow  
and laboured - blood pressure hard to  
obtain. Oxygen given 40 per cent by  
mask. Dr. Wilkinson called."

5

Thirty minutes later the child was pronounced dead.

6

7

Dr. Wilkinson's note begins at the  
bottom of page 130:

8

9

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11

12

13

"Called to see Paul, because of lack  
of responsiveness. When examined he  
had no detectable blood pressure,  
pulses, heart beat or respirations.  
Clearance of airway, stimulation and  
oxygen did not have any beneficial  
result.

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Paul had been noted to be sitting up;  
talked to his nurses and seemed well  
oriented just minutes before. No  
evidence of vomiting, aspiration.  
Had not been eating or drinking any-  
thing. Patient was pronounced dead  
at 10:28 p.m."

Again, the unanimous view of the  
physicians was that the death of Paul Murphy was  
entirely consistent with his clinical condition.

Dr. Hastreiter scored him a 9 on the severity rating.





1

2 Although Dr. Hastreiter felt that the terminal event  
3 had been somewhat sudden and unexpected he agreed  
4 that the death was a natural one. That evidence is  
5 found in Volume 81, page 7508 and certainly there were  
6 no symptoms, that I at least would recognize, as  
7 being those of digoxin intoxication recorded in the  
8 chart. There is no evidence of any sudden onset of  
9 bradycardia or vomiting or anything of that sort.

10 Dr. Rowe presumed or inferred that  
11 at the very end a major arrhythmia was experienced  
12 which caused the heart to stop and he said that the  
13 death, when it occurred, was a sudden one, as it  
indeed appears to have been.

14 In my submission, the matter of  
15 Paul Murphy's decline and death is very different  
16 from that which appears in many, many other cases.  
17 He declined to the point of death over a number of  
18 days and, in my submission, there is no reason to  
challenge the unanimous medical opinion that Paul  
19 Murphy died a natural death brought about by his  
cardiac status and clinical condition.

20 Laurette Heyworth, too, was an older  
21 child. She was 11 years old when she died on  
22 September 2nd, 1980. She died at 8:30 in the morning  
23 in Ward 4A and the members of Mrs Trayner's team

24

25





1

were on duty on 4A at that time. Like Paul Murphy Laurette Heyworth was not a stranger to the Hospital for Sick Children. The clinical condition was serious, very serious and she, too, had received a severity scoring of 9 from Dr. Hastreiter. Indeed, Mr. Commissioner, her prognosis was as gloomy as it could be. She had come to the end of her life and nothing could be done for her.

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On August 27th, though, a new symptom appeared, she vomited twice. The digoxin level taken that day was reported back with a level of 2.5 nanograms per millilitre. It was suspected that she might be showing some symptoms of digoxin toxicity and digoxin was, therefore, ordered held. That order appears at page 180 of the chart and at page 153 in the notes there is reference to it.

There was further vomiting on August 28th, the next day and digoxin was then ordered restarted and then re-ordered held again.

It appears that digoxin and other medications were kept on hold on August 29th until tomorrow morning. On August 29th, as appears from page 183 of the chart, digoxin was restarted, but to be administered intravenously. The order there appears on page 183 under date 29/8/1980 calling for





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8 2 lasix IV and digoxin IV twice a day.

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According to the medication sheet

at page 187 digoxin was administered on the 29th  
twice by Dr. Sturm. On September 30th the order  
was changed again and it appears at page 184, to an oral  
dose of digoxin. I am sorry, that is August 30th.  
It seems from the medication sheet that the drug was  
not administered on the 30th.

On page 188 it appears to have been

administered by nurses on the 31st and the 1st of  
September: oral administration.

- - - - -





H-1

DM/ac

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2 So there is a rather complicated history of  
3 digoxin orders for this child in the last two or  
4 three days of her life. Again, sir, I suggest  
5 the picture is one of steady decline. Page 165 of  
6 the chart, the nursing notes, it appears that  
7 during her last night she was cyanosed when not  
8 on oxygen, she had difficulty breathing, she was  
9 very jaundiced, complaining of thirst and dry mouth,  
10 severe swelling in her lower legs, abdominal pain,  
11 she was extremely restless. At 7:30 in the morning  
12 it is recorded that she was complaining of shortness  
13 of breath, she was on oxygen and very uncomfortable.  
14 At 8:30 in the morning she died.

15

16

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In my submission the chart discloses  
no symptoms of digoxin poisoning during the last  
hours of her life. Dr. Rowe suggested that the  
only symptom that might be indicative of digoxin  
toxicity was the recording of several ectopic heart  
beats since about midnight. Certainly there is  
no sign here of any acute episode of intoxication.  
There is no sudden change in her condition, no  
abrupt move from anything that looked like relative  
stability to the direst emergency. In my submission  
again this is simply not a pattern of death that  
was manifested in so many of the other cases. I





1

2 suggest, sir, that there is no reason to suspect  
3 that Laurette Heyworth died of anything but a  
4 natural death brought relentlessly on by her  
irreversible clinical condition.

Bruce Floryn was the third of  
the older children for whom a "do not resuscitate"  
order was in place. He was 19 years old when he  
died. He died on ward 4B at 6:20 of the morning of  
February the 7th. At that time there were members  
of the Trayner team on duty on ward 4A. Like  
Paul Murphy and Laurette Heyworth, Bruce Floryn  
had been in the Hospital for Sick Children several  
times and indeed consideration was given to him as  
a candidate for heart transplant but he was not  
considered a good candidate and that idea was  
abandoned. His condition was very serious and he  
was not going to get better. Nothing could be  
done for Bruce Floryn. Dr. Hastreiter gave him a  
severity rating of 9. Clearly he had chronic,  
severe and worsening congestive heart failure and  
by the time of his final admission on January 27th,  
1981, he had a host of other problems too.

His history, the ailments, and his course during his final hospital admission are summarized in the final autopsy report and in particular





H-3

1

2 pages 59 and 60 of the chart, and the narrative  
3 portion is on page 60. It is recorded:

4 " ... presented with congestive  
5 heart failure secondary to an  
6 idiopathic congestive cardiomyopathy.  
7 He had congenital AV block and  
8 received a cardiac pacemaker in  
9 1974. Severe congestive heart  
10 failure developed over the following  
11 few years. He had several admissions  
12 for medical management and was  
13 considered for cardiac transplantation  
14 but was rejected on the basis of  
15 very poor haemodynamic status.  
16 His recent medical therapy included  
17 digoxin, lasix, aldactone,  
18 Minipress, ASA, mycostatin. He  
19 presented this admission with  
20 increasing weight gain and edema  
21 in spite of increased dosage of  
22 his various medications. "

23 Indications as I understand it that CHF, congestive  
24 heart failure, was not being controlled.

25 " Other problems on admission  
26 included hyponatremia ... "





H-4

1

2 Which I understand to be too little sodium, I  
3 think:

4 " ... and multiple chronic stasis  
5 skin ulcers. Following admission  
6 the patient initially improved.  
7 Four days after, however, he  
8 developed purpura on his abdominal  
9 wall possibly secondary to chronic  
10 liver disease. Subsequently he  
11 began to deteriorate in spite of  
12 medical therapy with increasing  
13 weight gain, increasing edema  
14 and intermittent episodes of  
15 disorientation and confusion.  
16 His condition progressively  
17 worsened. An additional complaint  
18 noted just prior to death was  
19 severe chest pain and pain on  
20 swallowing. He died on the 11th  
21 day following admission. "

22 There is then set out the findings at autopsy and  
23 the final sentence of that second paragraph on  
24 page 60:

25 " Death in this case is attributed  
26 to severe congestive heart failure,





H-5

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" with contributing factors of multiple pulmonary thrombo-emboli and infarction. "

It then goes on to list further pathological findings in this child.

It appears from the notes at page 102 of the chart that the morning before he died Bruce Floryn was very disoriented, he got out of bed, he fell, he was uncomfortable during the night and could not get comfortable. All observations that are reminiscent of the chart of Laurette Heyworth that we looked at a few moments ago. Page 103 of the chart, during the day of February 6th, Bruce Floryn's father noted that his respirations had become shallower and that after administration of a Brompton cocktail, a sedative and analgesic. In the evening he was very unresponsive and limp and his blood pressure was down. There was increased cyanosis in his extremities and his respirations at one point were noted at being down to 16 per minute.

Page 104 of the chart Dr. Runge wrote a note at 11:00 in the evening on February the 6th and recorded:

" Reviewed patient secondary to (1) no





H-6

1

" urine output for 11½ hours. (2)

2

Very drowsy since receiving Brompton's cocktail. Responds appropriately to painful stimuli, rouseable.

3

Quickly falls back to sleep after responding with 1 or 2 words answer to simple questions. Has difficulty maintaining body temperature.

4

Pulse 60/min poor volume, regular.

5

Chest - good, air entry anteriorly, no creps.

6

Liver extended 6 cm. at right costal margin.

7

Impression: progressive end stage cardiac failure. "

8

Page 105, the nursing note, this is 6.2.81:

9

" At 2230 has not voided since 1200 hours.

10

Noted congested cough occasionally.

11

Respiration shallow difficult to rouse. Very brief periods of consciousness, unable to complete sentences.

12

Respirations remain shallow. "

13

This is 7.2.81, at 2:00 in the morning:

14

15





H-7

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2 " Lips are cyanosed. Extremities  
3 cyanosed. Basically unchanged  
4 mental state. No extensive periods  
5 of orientation noted. Remains  
6 very difficult to rouse. Very  
weak. "

7

8 His apex is unchanged, then at 6:10 on the morning  
9 of the 7th a sudden marked change in respirations,  
10 increased cyanosis, unresponsive, very shallow,  
11 weak, ineffective respirations, and Dr. Runge comes  
12 and he writes the note set out at the bottom of  
13 page 105. Upon arrival he finds no pulse,  
14 respirations undetectable, pupils fixed and dilated.  
15 The patient is pronounced dead at 6:30.

16

17 That, Mr. Commissioner, in my  
18 submission is a terribly sad picture of a young man  
19 finally succumbing to irreversible and progressively  
more severe congestive heart failure.

20

21 Now at 6:10, as I said, Nurse  
22 Bracewell noted a sudden marked change in respirations.  
23 Perhaps I would remind you respectfully of just  
what it was she said:

24

25 " Sudden marked change in respirations.  
Increased cyanosis. Unresponsive.  
Very shallow, weak, ineffective





H-8

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2 " respirations. "

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And with respect I suggest that

sounds not so much as a great change in the nature  
of his breathing, he had had shallow breathing for  
24 hours, but it was clearly a change in the degree  
of shallowness. Again, there is nothing noted of  
the kind that we have learned over the course of  
the last year to recognize as symptomatic of digoxin  
intoxication. I suggest the picture is of a patient  
who is loosening his hold over life over an extended  
period of time.

The unanimous medical opinion was

that death was not only consistent with but was  
caused by his clinical condition and that there was  
no indication of digoxin toxicity. I invite you  
respectfully, sir, to make those findings with  
respect to Bruce Floryn.

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I/DP/ko 2

The last of these "Do Not Resuscitate" patients is David Leith. He died at 10:30 in the morning on March 6th, 1981. He was six weeks old. His condition had worsened during the night. The Trayner nursing team was not on duty for the long night of March 5 to 6 and one member of the team only was on duty for the long day shift of March 6th when the child actually died.

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On February 2nd, David Leith had had a surgical repair of a coarctation of the aorta but he had other severe cardiac problems including hypoplastic left heart syndrome and he had severe congestive heart failure. He had a history of arrhythmias. I refer, for example, to the long day nursing note for March 2, page 170 of the chart, and it is recorded "Apex ranging from 140-152 mostly slightly irregular to more irregular towards end of shift". Bounding type of heart rate. Page 174, during the long day shift of March 3rd, it is noted the apex of 138-159 was one episode of irregularity. At the bottom of that page, 1900 hours, vital signs, apex 137 to 149 and five episodes of irregularities. That is on March 4.

David Leith's parents were aware that their child was not going to make it. Page 175, at the top, the long day of March 4, conversation is





1

I 2  
2 recorded, what the parents stated. The mother stated  
3 that it was difficult knowing he was not going to make  
4 it. The nursing note on the long day of March 5th,  
5 page 176, apex 150 to 142, two episodes of irregularity.

6 At the bottom of page 176, sir, there  
7 is a note which I believe to be written by  
8 Dr. Mangera recording a visit, and review of the child,  
9 on March 5 at 8:15 in the evening. On page 177, a  
10 further note I believe from Dr. Mangera. On the 5th  
11 she recorded urine output reduced, weight was up, fast  
12 respiration and distress and the liver was enlarged,  
13 extending to 3 centimetres.

14 On the 6th the note is "Worse.  
15 Tachypneic, cyanosed, distressed." Respiratory rate,  
16 60 to 70, indrawing, cyanosed, urinary output down,  
17 question mark pulmonary edema, proposes lasix, chest  
18 X-ray - massive oversized heart. Then at the bottom  
19 "hold next dose of dig.". I will leave it at that.  
20 I am not exactly clear on my reading of the evidence  
about this child.

21 Page 178, the cardiology fellow has a  
22 note "CHF worsened, severe (something). Lasix twice  
produced a poor response. Pulmonary edema and massive  
cardiomegaly. The mother was informed."

23 The final nursing note found on page 178  
24  
25





1

I 3            2 in the lower half of the page from 7:30 in the evening  
3 of the 6th until 7:15 in the morning - respiration  
4 more than 100 per minute throughout the night. At  
5 4:20 in the prone position at the end of naso-  
6 gastric tube, respiration rate down to 50, then down  
7 to 40 at 4:30. Air hungry and deep indrawing. Colour  
8 remained very pale and dusky. Dr. Mangera was called.  
9 Child was given lasix. IV initiated by Dr. Mangera.  
10 Following lasix voided 5 cc of urine. Very restless -  
11 given morphine; given sodium bicarb; given phenobarb.  
12 At 7:30, at the bottom of the page, respiratory rate  
13 goes up to 126 minutes, apex is stable and the colour  
14 very slightly improved. The note on page 179, at  
15 10:35 in the morning of the 6th, babe in mother's  
16 arms, 60 percent oxygen, colour pasty gray, gasping  
17 respirations from 60 to 28 to zero. Apex 128 down to  
18 100, down to 60 to zero. Blood pressure from 80 over  
19 pulse at beginning of shift, went down to 40 over  
20 pulse. Babe became more agitated. Morphine was given  
21 at about 9:30. The patient's monitor showed that his  
22 heart stopped at 10:25. No irregularity noted there,  
23 slowing certainly but not irregularity, no arrhythmias,  
24 no arrhythmias noted of any kind. Again in my  
25 submission it is a picture of a small terribly sick  
child who faded away and died. All of the physicians





1

I 4  
2 for the Hospital for Sick Children and outside agreed  
3 this was a natural death. In my submission there is  
4 nothing in the chart or in the evidence which provides  
5 any sort of a basis for dispute over that conclusion.  
6 I invite you to make a finding that is consistent with  
7 the unanimous opinion of the medical experts.

8 Mr. Commissioner, those are the patients  
9 for whom no resuscitation was attempted and having  
10 now reviewed each of those cases I make the observation  
11 to which I earlier referred. In none of those five  
12 cases is there any suggestion or evidence that digoxin  
13 toxicity may have played a part in causing death. In  
14 my submission you should find that each of these  
15 children died from natural causes and that no  
16 suspicion attaches to any of those five deaths. If  
17 that be so, and I say again one has to wonder whether  
18 mercy killing of which we heard a good deal during the  
19 course of the evidence is an acceptable explanation  
20 for the deaths of other children. Those other children  
21 I have already made submissions about and suggested  
22 that they were not killed. About others for whom there  
23 is serious reason to think that they may have been  
24 killed by deliberate overdoses, if euthanasia was a  
25 motive one has to wonder why Babies Perreault and Leith  
were allowed to linger on until their inevitable deaths





1

I 5

2 occurred naturally.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: I am just wondering  
4 about that. Is it not possible that when the children  
5 were dying that there was no need for mercy killing?  
6 Mercy killing is in a sense killing to speed up the  
7 deaths, or if mercy killing was to save from an  
8 unsatisfactory life, it might be different. I don't  
9 know.

10 MR. LAMEK: I suppose my only  
11 difficulty with that proposition, Mr. Commissioner,  
12 is that there are children for whom surgery was planned,  
13 Cook, and of whom it would be my submission that he was  
14 killed, it is difficult to understand why in an attempt  
15 to avoid suffering there would be contemplation of  
16 killing a child for whom surgery was planned by which he  
17 might thereby be improved and not elect to shorten the  
18 life of someone who is irreversibly sick and clearly  
19 in very great difficulty.

20 Secondly, Mr. Commissioner, the way  
21 in which these children came, in my submission, to a  
22 perfectly natural death is in very stark contrast  
23 to the pattern of terminal events to which I have  
24 already referred in children already discussed and to  
25 which I will refer again often, I do not for a moment  
presume to challenge Dr. Rowe's evidence that any





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I 6

2 pediatric cardiac patient can go into an irreversible  
3 rapid decline in the blinking of an eye. I do not  
4 challenge that that can happen in any of these  
5 children. I have no doubt that it can.

6 Respectfully I point out two things.  
7 First, the nurses, and I am not pitting their experience  
8 against that of Dr. Rowe, but the nurses were clearly  
9 troubled by the fact that patients who appeared  
10 relatively stable suddenly went sour and died. Second,  
11 we have just reviewed five patients including two  
12 infants who in my submission clearly died natural  
13 deaths. Not one of them displayed that pattern of  
14 terminal events, a sudden precipitous decline from  
15 relative stability. No doubt it can occur in any  
16 pediatric patient. In my submission it did not occur  
17 in these five natural deaths.

18 Mr. Commission, I propose to turn now  
19 to a group of four babies for whom there are  
20 toxicological data which may be suggestive of digoxin  
21 toxicity having played a part in their deaths. Again  
22 I propose to deal with them chronologically in the  
23 order of their deaths. They are Babies Thomas, Gionas,  
24 Inwood and Gardner.

25 Jennifer Thomas died in Room 418 on  
Ward 4A at 3:38 in the morning of February 12th, 1981.





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I 7  
2 When she was nine days old she was admitted to  
3 hospital on February 10th. She suffered an onset of  
4 critical symptoms at 3 o'clock on that morning and  
5 that led swiftly to cardiac arrest and death. Mrs.  
6 Trayner's team was on duty on Ward 4A for the long  
7 night shift of February 11 to 12.

Baby Thomas was scheduled to go to  
8 surgery for a bypass operation later in the morning  
9 of February 12. She did not of course survive to  
10 reach surgery.

Dr. Rowe in Volume 16 at page 2770  
11 described the surgery which was planned as heroic  
12 emergency surgery. This was no routine operative  
13 intervention that they had planned. This was a very,  
14 very sick child, another hypoplastic left heart  
15 syndrome case. Dr. Hastreiter gave her a severity  
16 rating of 10. Dr. Nadas, reviewing the case for the  
17 CDC, rated her condition on admission as intermediate  
18 but her prognosis as poor. She was being treated with  
19 digoxin and diuretics for congestive heart failure  
20 and with prostaglandin to keep the ductus open until  
21 she could get to the OR. Unfortunately, she developed  
22 secondary effects from the prostaglandin, affected her  
23 body temperature and the dosage or more precisely the  
24 rate of infusion had to be reduced. The physicians  
25





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I 8

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were in the classic 'no win' situation. She needed  
the prostaglandin to keep the ductus open but was  
suffering side effects from the prostaglandin.

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J-1

RD/ac

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If we turn to the chart, sir, and to the nursing note by Nurse Scott for the long nightshift of February 11th to 12th is found at page 78. It records that her apex - 180 to 140 was regular until 0300 hours. Her temperature was high. That was the effects of prostaglandin. The respiration was very regular and shallow, ranging from 96 to 82. Blood pressure between 80 and 76 over pulse. Left hand and right leg extremely cyanotic and cool to the touch. She was feeding eagerly, taking a total of 33 cc. Similac each feed and she had two feedings, tolerated feedings. An hour and a half after 11 p.m. feed, she vomited approximately 20 ccs. mostly mucus and an order was written that she was to be nothing by mouth. She was going to surgery. Elimination satisfactory in the prostaglandin. She, halfway through that note on the prostaglandin, the IV PGE rate was reduced to 1 cc. per hour due to high temperature.

18

So we have the child, she vomited at about 12:30, half an hour after midnight. There is no prior note of vomiting in the chart that I have seen, sir. 3:00 in the morning there is a very sudden change. The apex which had been regular, ranging from 140 to 180, now drops below 140 and

24

25





J-2

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2 becomes irregular and proceeds quickly, according  
3 to the note, to what Nurse Scott describes as  
4 atrial flutter. CPR was started and a Code 25 was  
5 called and an unsuccessful resuscitation effort  
6 took place.

7

8 On page 77, the opposite page, sir,  
9 is Dr. Heilbut's note. He records that Jennifer  
10 apparently developed irregular rhythm and bradycardia  
11 at 3:10 a.m. and went into ventricular fibrillation.  
12 She appears to describe as ventricular fibrillation  
13 what Nurse Scott had called atrial flutter.

14

15 All of the physicians who have  
16 commented on this child, including Dr. Hastreiter  
17 and the CDC, view her death as consistent with her  
18 clinical condition, sir. Dr. Rowe's evidence is  
19 particularly interesting on the cause of death  
20 and found in Volume 16, page 2771, beginning at the  
21 bottom of the page where he said, having described  
22 the surgery that was proposed for the day she died,  
23 at line 23:

24

25 " Part of the problem was that the  
26 baby developed secondary effects  
27 of the prostaglandins which had  
28 to be reduced in dosage, and when  
29 the dosage has to be reduced there





J-3

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" is a risk that the ductus will begin to close, and if that happens everything starts to deteriorate.

2

I would think that it is conceivable that that was the way in which this baby proceeded and the terminal events would be related to that. "

3

Then again at page 2777, I was asking Dr. Rowe about the terminal events and symptoms described in the chart and beginning at line 10, and then Dr. Heilbut's note on page 77, the lower half of the page:

4

Jennifer apparently developed irregular rhythm and bradycardia at 3:10 in the morning. Went into ventricular fibrillation and was therefore defibrillated. Routine cardiac resuscitative measures were instituted but to no avail.

5

Time of death 3:38 a.m.

6

It is almost a pattern we have come to recognize, those terminal events, isn't it, Doctor?

7

A. Yes. It is.

8

Q. Very sudden onset of them?

9

10





J-4

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" A. Yes.

3

Q. Very rapid course. Vomiting  
at 12:30 in the morning, arrhythmias,  
bradycardia to ventricular  
fibrillation.

6

Are those events, their onset and  
their course consistent in your  
judgement with digoxin intoxication,  
Doctor?

10

A. Yes. They are.

11

Q. Are they consistent in your  
judgement with the child's anatomical  
and clinical condition?

13

A. Yes. They are.

14

Q. Does one have to posit a closing  
or a constricting of the ductus  
in order to find that consistency?

17

A. Yes. "

18

Death and the manner of dying, as I understood  
Dr. Rowe, were consistent with the clinical condition  
if the ductus closed or became constricted.

20

21

I take you from there, sir, to page  
34 of the chart, the final autopsy report.

22

23

For reasons that aren't exactly clear,  
page 1 of the final autopsy report is found at page 50.

24

25





J- 5

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2 Page numbered 34 is, in fact, page 2 of the autopsy  
3 report.

4 In the final paragraph, reporting  
5 on the findings of autopsy, it is said halfway  
6 through the paragraph:

7 " The ductus was patent, 7 mm in  
8 diameter. "

9 Now, I put that finding to Dr. Rowe and at page 2773  
10 of the same volume 16, the following exchange took  
place beginning at line 7:

11 " MR. LAMEK: Q. Doctor, at autopsy  
12 it was discovered that the ductus  
13 had an opening of 7 millimetres.

14 Can you tell me whether that  
15 represents some closing or whether  
the ductus was still fully patent?

16 That is at page 50.

17 A. Yes. Well, I think that there  
18 is always a discrepancy between  
19 the anatomic findings and the  
functional findings.

20 There is a substantial amount of  
21 work in that regard experimentally  
22 and it shows that you can close  
23 the ductus so that no blood gets

24

25





J-6

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2 " through it and yet at autopsy  
3 (and I am talking about animal  
4 work) the ductus is moderately  
5 widely open so this is related  
6 perhaps in part to the age of the  
7 patient and the way in which they  
die. "

8 As I understand Dr. Rowe, his evidence comes to this  
9 that notwithstanding the autopsy finding, as stated  
10 in the autopsy report, there may have been a  
11 sufficient constriction of the ductus to reduce the  
12 blood flow through it below the point needed by the  
13 child to secure reasonable oxygenation of her blood.  
14 If that happened it would explain her death and  
15 manner of dying. And I accept that, of course, as  
16 an honestly held opinion and one that is entitled  
17 to considerable respect, because of its source, but  
18 it is, however, an informed conjecture as to what  
19 may have happened to cause Jennifer Thomas' sudden  
deterioration, arrest and death.

20 It may be a perfectly valid conjecture  
21 and happily I am obliged to say that it is what it  
22 is, but there are several features of the death that  
23 may be ground for suspicion, that some other cause may  
have intervened.

24

25





J-7

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2                   In the first place, there are what  
3 I call the circumstantial elements, the pattern, the  
4 common thread elements, death in the middle of the  
5 night and the presence of members of the same nursing  
6 team, a period of apparent cardiac stability, vomiting  
7 at 12:30, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, the sudden appearance of  
8 bradycardia, irregularities, ventricular fibrillation  
9 or atrial flutter. The cardiac function at 3:00 o'clock in  
10 the morning goes totally awry and a resuscitation  
11 effort that is to no avail.

12                  There are also digoxin findings  
13 in fixed tissues which may, taken with everything  
14 else be of some significance. That is found at  
15 Exhibit 95A, sir, pages 9 to 10.

16                  In fixed heart tissue there were  
17 concentrations measured in the left ventricle of  
18 55 nanograms per gram of digoxin. In the left  
19 atrium 63 nanograms of digoxin and digoxin-like  
20 substances and in the septum 15 nanograms of digoxin.

21                  Mr. Cimbura notes those concentrations  
22 were likely high before the tissues were put into  
23 Klotz solution.

24                  If you turn to page 4 of Exhibit 95A,  
25 sir, you will note no. 3 which is a note following  
the recital of the levels found in the Cook tissues.





J-8

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You will see a note to the effect that in fresh tissues  
the range of concentrations in ventricle of infant's  
on digoxin therapy, as Baby Thomas was, runs or ran  
as then reported in the literature, from 49 to 975  
nanograms and the range in cases of fatal poisoning,  
ran from 108 to 1240 nanograms, a vast area of overlay.

Therefore, although the concentrations  
in Baby Thomas' fresh heart tissue may well have  
been higher than those found in the fixed tissues,  
one cannot say how much higher, if at all, and the  
levels, as they are recorded, fall squarely within  
the therapeutic range of concentrations in fresh  
tissue.

On page 10 of Exhibit 95A, sir,  
there is the recording of a level in fixed lung tissue,  
a level of 45 nanograms per gram of digoxin. That may  
have been higher before the tissue was fixed,  
but even as it stood it was beyond the therapeutic  
range of concentrations recorded in the literature,  
as noted by Mr. Cimbura on page 4, note 4 and well  
into the fatal poisoning range of concentrations in  
lung tissue, in fresh lung tissue as recorded there.

Whether those ranges are still  
appropriate, there may be some reason to doubt.  
Certainly as at the time they were recorded it





J-9

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2 appears that the lung tissue, at least in fixed  
3 tissue, the lung concentration of the fixed  
4 tissue, exceeded the therapeutic range in fresh  
5 lung tissue.

6 In other words, Mr. Commissioner,  
7 I suggest no more than this: there may be some  
8 basis in the toxicological evidence to suggest that  
9 the terminal events and death of Jennifer Thomas may  
10 have been not merely consistent with, perhaps  
11 attributable to digoxin toxicity. It has to be  
12 said, of course, the pharmacologist didn't rate very  
13 highly the likelihood of digoxin toxicity in this  
case.

14 Dr. Hastreiter at the preliminary  
15 hearing expressed the view that digoxin toxicity  
16 was not likely and Dr. Kauffman gave the child a  
17 digoxin score of 1 in his scoring for the CDC.

18 But notwithstanding that, it is  
19 my submission to you , sir, in light of the lack  
20 of any clear evidence, to support Dr. Rowe's  
21 hypothesis as to the cause of death, the symptoms  
22 displayed by the child from 12:30 to 3:30 on the  
23 morning she died, the toxicological data, to the  
24 extent it may be corroborative of the symptomatology  
25 and the presence of the other circumstantial evidence





J-10

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2           in light of all those things, you would be justified  
3           in finding this is a death which gives rise to  
4           some suspicion or concern that it may have been  
5           caused by digoxin toxicity and go no further  
6           than that, and I would not seek to.

7

8           The next child is Barbara Gionas,  
9           once again a very sick child. She was admitted to  
10          the Hospital for Sick Children on January 23rd, 1981  
11          when she was one day old. She had surgery on  
12          January 26th and again on February 18th. She died  
13          at 1:45 in the morning on March 9th, 1981 in room  
14          418 having suffered an onset of critical symptoms  
15          or terminal events an hour earlier.

16

17          Once again members of the Trayner  
18          nursing team were on duty.

19

20          We go first in this case, sir, to  
21          the events on the night when Barbara Gionas died.  
22          At page 77 of the chart there is Nurse Trayner's  
23          nursing note for the period from 7:30 in the evening  
24          until midnight. She records that Barbara's apex  
25          was irregular at the time and remained irregular  
              throughout the night. It was irregular in that it  
              was much slower (130's) with short pauses. The ECG  
              strip showed "sinus arrest". I should tell you that  
              Dr. Rowe interpreted that note to mean that what she





J-11

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2 was seeing was junctional rhythm where there are  
3 no T waves visible on the ECG.

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K-1

DM/ac

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2 The baby was extremely restless all evening,  
3 records Mrs. Trayner and was very hard to settle.  
4 At 45 minutes past midnight she was being fed and  
5 was increasingly restless. She was sweaty and  
6 clammy and the apex started to fall and she became  
7 very bradycardic. A 23 was called and Dr. Soulioti  
8 came and gave lasix and atropin.

9 At 1:00, 15 minutes after that  
10 first observation, there was no heartbeat at all.  
CPR was started and a Code 25 was called.

11 At the top of page 77 there is  
12 Dr. Mounstephen's arrest note. He records when  
he:

13 " Arrived child intubated, external  
14 massage in progress. IV adrenaline ..." .  
15 And so on, no result, asystolic:

16 " ... intracardiac adrenaline done,  
17 no result, asystolic.

18 Repeated drugs again, no electrical  
19 activity.

20 45 minutes into arrest no electrical  
activity for 45 minutes. Pupils  
21 fixed dilated and no output and  
22 the efforts stopped. "

23 The baby was pronounced dead at 1:45 in the morning.

24

25





K-2

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Now Dr. Rowe agreed that that pattern  
and those symptoms were consistent with digoxin  
toxicity, but he also pointed out, and this is  
found at Volume 18, page 3132 and again at pages 3137,  
3138, that on earlier occasions Baby Gionas had  
exhibited similar symptoms. That is to say on  
previous occasions the chart discloses episodes  
of bradycardia, vomiting, occasional nodal beats,  
atrial flutter, 2 to 1 heartblock and so on. Indeed  
the last two symptoms, the atrial flutter and the  
AV block, plus on that occasion some tachycardia  
and vomiting had occurred on March the 7th. Dr.  
Kobayashi suspecting the possibility that those  
symptoms were manifestations of dig. toxicity had  
ordered digoxin held and had a dig. level done.  
The previous level on the patient had been 1.9. The  
level that Dr. Kobayashi ordered was reported back  
as 1.2 nanograms per millilitre. Dr. Rowe's point  
of course was this, that this baby could exhibit  
symptoms consistent with digoxin toxicity even when  
the level showed that the child clearly was not  
toxic. Therefore the appearance of such symptoms  
as part of terminal events certainly was no necessary  
indication of digoxin toxicity, and it was his view  
that the symptoms were the product of her congestive

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K-3

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2 heart failure.

3 So Mr. Commissioner, we have a  
4 familiar circumstantial pattern, final onset and  
5 presence of team with the sudden deterioration and  
6 the manifestation of symptoms that on the face of  
7 it are consistent with digoxin intoxication. When  
8 we review the medical evidence, all of the physicians  
9 agreed that Baby Gionas' death was consistent with  
10 her disease condition. The only physician who  
11 expressed any suspicion that digoxin might be involved  
12 in the death was Dr. Hastreiter and he was far from  
13 confident, and this is found in Volume 81, pages  
14 7526 and 7535.

15 Now Dr. Kauffman like everyone else  
16 recognized that the death and the terminal symptoms  
17 were also consistent with digoxin toxicity, but  
18 he was unable to express an opinion as to digoxin  
19 having caused or contributed to death because the  
20 toxicological information was not in his judgement  
21 adequate to provide a basis for any such opinion.  
22 But he scored the death a 2 with respect to possible  
23 digoxin involvement. The CDC for reasons that are  
24 not exactly clear catagorized the Gionas death as  
25 giving rise to special concern re: digoxin intoxication.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think that was one





K-4

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2 of the reasons given by Dr. Kauffman.

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4 MR. LAMEK: That he had given it  
5 a 2 despite the lack of clear toxicological information,  
6 yes, clearly the symptoms impressed him. There  
7 is another case that we will come to.

8

9

10

Dr. Mirkin had the same hesitation  
that Dr. Kauffman had. The toxicological data  
are found in Exhibit 95E pages 2 to 3 and all the  
levels were measured in tissue and material obtained  
at autopsy after exhumation of Baby Gionas' body.

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Now the only items to which I refer  
and I do so Mr. Commissioner fully cognisant of  
all that had been said about the difficulties of  
interpretation of digoxin concentrations in exhumed  
tissues, the only items to which I refer are specimens  
T83, specimen of liver; specimen T84, specimen of  
right lung; T85 specimen of left lung. Now, in  
each of those specimens, the concentrations measured  
were above the range of therapeutic concentrations  
as recorded then by Mr. Cimbura, and well into the  
range of fatally toxic concentrations as they are  
recorded for corresponding fresh tissue.

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Once again I cannot tell you with  
confidence whether those ranges remained the last  
word in the literature. I put it no higher than this





K-5

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2 in any event, Mr. Commissioner. Certainly I don't  
3 suggest that those concentrations in those specimens  
4 standing alone would be any reliable evidence of  
5 toxicity. I do suggest that the levels taken in  
6 the context of the features that I enumerated earlier  
7 may, and in my submission do, justify a finding  
8 that a measure of suspicion attaches to the death  
9 of Barbara Gionas.

10 I am going to move to another  
11 child, Mr. Commissioner, may we adjourn two minutes  
12 early.

13 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. 2:15 then.

14 MR. LAMEK: Thank you.

15 ---Luncheon Recess

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1            ---On resuming.

2            THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Lamek.

3            MR. LAMEK: Mr. Commissioner, over  
4            the course of the lunch break I have said to you what  
5            I take it is already very obvious that it is very  
6            certain I will not complete my submissions today.  
7            I have also said to you in light of that and in light  
8            of the fact that I am not sure that my voice will  
9            last until 4:30 I may ask you to end perhaps at the  
10          break today with the chance of completing tomorrow  
11          rather than go on until 4:30 today and be voiceless  
12          tomorrow. Perhaps I can press on until that stage  
13          in any event.

14          THE COMMISSIONER: It is a case what-  
15          ever is the break or your voice whichever should come  
16          first.

17          MR. LAMEK: Whichever should come  
18          first, maybe the break in my voice will.

19          We have reached the case I think of  
20          Kristin Inwood. This is a baby who was three weeks  
21          old and she died at 3:00 a.m. on March the 13th,  
22          1981 on Ward 4B, and once again members of the Trayner  
23          nursing team were on duty at the time of the death.

24          Again she was a sick child and there  
25          was a general consensus among the medical experts  
              that her death was consistent with her diseased





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condition, but there was some feeling on the part of Dr. Hastreiter particularly that her death was not expected to occur just when it did. I don't intend here to go through the clinical picture because in my submission the factors for and against viewing this death as suspicious or something more are almost independent of the clinical history.

Once it is conceded as it generally is that her clinical condition could have caused her death really the only remaining question is, did it.

There are a number of facts which in my submission are important. The first of them is that the autopsy revealed no clear cause of death. I refer you please to the autopsy report in the chart beginning at page 20. It is the final autopsy report and in particular at page 21, the narrative portion. The penultimate paragraph on page 21 reads:

"Several factors may have contributed to the death of this infant. However, no clear cause is defined. The infant had cardiomegaly secondary to moderate aortic coarctation.

Focal myocardial necrosis presumably on a hypoxic or ischemic basis was present and could conceivably act as





Lamek (Argument)

1                             "focus of electrical instability.  
2                             The lung finding of massive amniotic  
3                             squame aspiration is significant with  
4                             respect to contributing to the infant's  
5                             respiratory distress. This appeared to  
6                             be in a stage of resolution however and  
7                             is not a likely explanation for the  
infant's cardiac arrest."

8                             So the pathologists although they  
9                             looked around and saw several possible contributing  
10                            factors could find no clear cause of death. We have  
11                            heard of course that that is not unusual and I accept  
12                            that. But whereas here no cause of death is revealed  
13                            at autopsy, that I suggest hardly calms concerns and  
14                            still suspcion about what the cause of death of the  
15                            child may have been, particularly when there are  
16                            other factors which may point in another rather less  
                                 pleasant direction.

17                            The second fact concerns Baby Inwood's  
18                            death itself and her manner of dying. The sudden  
19                            onset of rhythm abnormalities, bradycardia, proceeding  
20                            to arrest, to death and that pattern was generally  
21                            conceded by the physicians to be consistent with  
                                 digoxin toxicity.

22                            The third fact, a sample of what  
23                            appears to have been ante mortem serum was found to

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2 contain 491 nanograms per millilitre of digoxin.  
3 You will remember, sir, there was much debate and  
4 discussion about the providence, history and handling  
5 of that specimen, but in my submission it all came  
6 down at the end of the day to this. The material  
7 appears to have been serum prepared and stored at  
8 the Hospital for Sick Children. The sample may have  
9 been frozen or heated at different times, or both.  
10 But on the evidence that you have heard neither of  
11 those experiences on the evidence you have heard can  
12 be shown to render unreliable the results of the  
13 digoxin assays on the material.

14 Miss Cronk pointed out to me that the  
15 specimen would be a post mortem specimen of serum  
16 rather than ante mortem I think I described it as,  
17 I think that is probably right.

18 Third about this specimen, if the  
19 491 level is a true and reliable level, there is  
20 general agreement among the pharmacologists that  
21 Kristin Inwood received a substantial dose of digoxin  
22 some time before her death. As Dr. Mirkin said, I  
23 really don't care if you tell me to divide that  
24 number by 4 I am only talking about 125 and that  
25 doesn't change my view, but if that number is a  
reliable number even reducing it by some post mortem





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2 multiplier I still have a level that persuades me there  
3 was a large dose of digoxin given to this child.

4 If indeed Kristin Inwood did receive  
5 a large dose of digoxin before her death, and in my  
6 submission you are entitled to find that she did, the  
7 questions then become; first, could the dose have been  
8 administered accidentally or in error. Second, did  
9 she receive the dose sufficiently in advance of her  
10 death that there could have been distribution to  
11 tissues in sufficient quantities to have caused or  
12 contributed to her death.

13 As to the possibility of the digoxin  
14 dose having been given by error, it has been suggested  
15 that an error may have occurred in the administration  
16 of what was intended to be lasix, one milligram IV  
17 at 2310 to 2315 on the night of her death. Now that  
18 suggestion is of course entirely speculative as to  
19 whether such an error ever occurred.

20 Dr. Kauffman when the suggestion was  
21 put to him said and his evidence is found at Volume  
22 72, pages 5846 to 5849 and again in Volume 83, pages  
23 8144 - 8155. He said in his view such an error was  
24 unlikely, and in any event he said that that error  
25 even if it occurred would not in his judgment have  
delivered sufficient digoxin to explain the serum





6

1 or tissue levels found in this child.

2 As to the second question whether  
3 the dose of digoxin played a part in Kristin Inwood's  
4 death, or whether it was administered so late, so  
5 close to death as to have remained entirely in blood  
6 and not to have been distributed through tissue where  
7 it could have a pharmacological effect, a fourth fact  
8 becomes relevant.

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The fourth fact, in my submission,  
which is important is this, that fixed and exhumed  
tissues of this child contained concentrations of  
digoxin which, in the opinion of Dr. Hastreiter and  
Dr. Kauffman are corroborative of the view that  
digoxin toxicity probably caused or contributed to  
the deaths. Starting with the levels, sir, found in  
Exhibit 95A, page 7 to 8, those are the fixed tissue  
levels and in 95E, page 3, the exhumed. The levels  
recorded in fixed tissue in Exhibit 95A are in heart  
tissue and they are levels all expressed as digoxin,  
that is to say, by assay by RIA following HPLC, 230  
nanograms per gram in the left ventricle, 79  
nanograms per gram in the left atrium, and 300  
nanograms per gram in the septum. Concentrations in  
the left ventricle and septum are in the area of  
overlap between the therapeutic and slightly toxic  
concentrations in corresponding fresh tissue. In  
Exhibit 95E at page 3, a sample of exhumed thigh  
muscle was assayed and produced a level of 166  
nanograms per gram of digoxin and that appears to be  
within the fatally toxic range of digoxin  
concentrations as reported by Mr. Cimbura from  
fresh thigh muscle.

23

24

25

At Volume 76, pages 6744 to 6745,





1 Dr. Hastreiter, although clearly  
BB2 2 cognizant of the problems of levels...  
3 in exhumed tissues and presumably he would not want  
4 to rely on such levels if they were the only data  
5 available, considered that the fixed tissue levels  
6 could be looked to as corroborative of the serum  
7 level. That is to say, as I understand it, the fixed  
8 tissue levels which are in themselves high lend  
9 credibility to the very high serum level and by  
10 virtue of being high suggest that the digoxin had  
11 already distributed to the point of elevating tissue  
12 levels. Dr. Kauffman's view, which is stated in  
13 Volume 72, page 5846 to 5849, was, as I understand it,  
14 essentially to the same effect. He regarded it as  
15 corroborative information. It was the view of  
16 Doctors MacLeod, Kauffman, Hastreiter and Mirkin that  
17 if the serum level of 491 were valid, as to which  
18 you have my submission, sir, then a very large dose  
19 of digoxin was given to Kristin Inwood. I have  
20 referred to such evidence as there is as to the  
21 likelihood of such a drug being administered in  
22 error. Doctors Kauffman, Mirkin and Hastreiter  
23 further opined, again, of course, assuming the  
24 validity of the serum level, that digoxin might have  
25 caused or contributed to the death of Baby Inwood.





1

BB3      2 In my submission, there is no reason in the evidence  
3 to doubt the validity of the recorded serum  
4 concentration of 491 nanograms and, that being so,  
5 you are entitled to find, sir, and I respectfully  
6 say you should find, that the concentration resulted  
7 from the administration of a very large and  
8 unprescribed dose of digoxin as to which, first, there  
9 is no evidence upon which a finding of accidental  
10 or mistaken administration may properly be based and,  
11 secondly, in light of the recorded levels of digoxin  
12 in fixed and exhumed tissue and the corroborative use  
13 that can be made of those orders of levels, according  
14 to Doctors Hastreiter and Kauffman, you are entitled  
15 to find that those deaths resulted from that overdose.  
16 Essentially, the whole question of Kristin Inwood's  
17 death revolves, in my submission, around the view that  
18 is taken of the serum concentration.

19                  That, sir, brings me to the last child  
20 in this group, Charlon Gardner. This baby, too, died  
21 in the early hours of the morning at 4:25 a.m. on  
22 March the 18th, 1981, Room 418 on Ward 4A, having  
23 suffered a sudden onset of terminal symptoms at  
24 3:45 a.m. Members of the Trayner Nursing Team were on  
25 duty on 4 and 4A that night.





1

BB4

2 Charlon Gardner was extremely ill.

3

Dr. Hastreiter gave her a severity rating of nine.

4

Dr. Nadas regarded her prognosis as poor. She was  
regarded as being at a high risk of death, the

5

opinion expressed by Dr. Rowe in Volume 22, pages  
4077 to 4078 and Dr. Freedom, Volume 29, page 5481.

6

Once again, there was agreement among all the  
physicians and pharmacologists that the baby's death

7

was consistent with her diseased condition. Equally,  
there was consensus that her death was consistent

8

with digoxin intoxication. You will remember, sir,

9

that Charlon Gardner fell into that group of children,  
described by Nurse Scott, who was stable in the early

10

part of the shift. She went for her break and on her  
return this child still appeared stable. Shortly

11

afterwards, she suddenly got into very serious  
difficulty that led rapidly to arrest and death.

12

That evidence of Nurse Scott is contained in Volume  
118, page 6903.

13

It appears from Nurse Scott's note  
from the long night's shift, March 17 to 18, found

14

at page 57 of the chart, until 3:30 in the morning,  
Baby Gardner's heart rate was regular and was

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recorded in a fairly narrow range from 162 to 178  
beats per minute. She had a somewhat elevated

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BB5 2 temperature, respiration range between 70 and 50 and  
3 there were two apneic spells. The respiration range,  
4 at one point, went down to 37. There was rapid,  
5 shallow breathing - it is not exactly clear what the  
6 timing of the apneic episodes were or of the change in  
7 the pattern of breathing.

8 Dr. Kobayashi was called at 2:30  
9 because of the apneic spells. He then reduced the  
10 prostaglandic flow rate. At 3:30, Baby Gardner  
11 suddenly became bradycardic and the heart rate  
12 became very irregular, Nurse Scott notes. At that  
13 point, Dr. Kobayashi was called again at 3:30 when  
14 the baby suddenly became bradycardic and the heart  
15 beat became very irregular.  
16 His note is on page 60 of the chart. He records: 3:30,  
17 called to see baby because of bradycardia and  
18 irregular heart rate, 102 per minute, ectopic  
19 punctual beats. I have trouble reading the next  
20 phrase. Went further bradycardic to 95 per minute  
21 and then to ventricular fibrillation. CPR for 45  
22 minutes with intracardiac adreline without success.  
23 Code was called in fact at 3:25 and the arrest note  
24 is found on page 56. There, there is reference to  
25 another observation which does not occur in either





1

BB6 2 Dr. Kobayashi's note or Nurse Scott's note, the  
3 lower part of page 56, the middle paragraph:

4 "Previous sinus rhythm progressed  
5 via junctional rhythm, AV block to  
6 extreme bradycardia, gasping  
respiration."

7 As far as I know, that is the only reference in  
8 the contemporaneous notes to AV block having occurred  
9 with this child.

10 "CPR was commenced immediately with  
11 external cardiac massage and (something)  
12 ventilation..."

13 Virtually every trick in the  
14 resuscitation book was tried. None provoked any  
15 response at all from Charlon Gardner, as set out at  
16 the top of page 57, and she was pronounced dead after  
17 40 minutes effort at 4:25 in the morning. There are  
18 toxicological findings on this child and they are  
19 found in Exhibits 95A and 95B. In 95A at pages 8  
20 to 9, there are recorded concentrations found in  
21 fixed heart tissue: left ventrical, 141 nanograms  
22 per gram of digoxin; left atrium, 43 nanograms per  
23 gram of digoxin and septum, 135 nanograms per gram  
24 of digoxin. One should add, in respect to those

25





1

BB7 2 heart tissues, those levels or concentrations in  
3 the fixed left ventricle and septum . . . . . are  
4 in the overlap area between therapeutic and slightly  
5 toxic ranges recorded in corresponding fresh tissue.

6 In Exhibit 95B, at page 2, there is  
7 reported a concentration in fixed lung tissue of 37  
8 nanograms per gram of digoxin and, so far as relates  
9 to the ranges set out by Mr. Cimbura, which were  
10 apparently then correct but may not be now, at that  
11 time - the lung concentration of 37 nanograms per  
12 gram of digoxin was beyond the therapeutic range  
13 found in fresh tissue and into the fatal toxic range  
14 of fresh, lung tissue.

15 Notwithstanding that and, no doubt,  
16 being very careful scientists, Dr. Kauffman gave  
17 a digoxin score of one for Baby Gardner and  
18 Dr. Hastreiter thought that digoxin toxicity was  
19 unlikely.

20 It is my submission to you, sir,  
21 however, that, in light of Mr. Cimbura's findings,  
22 the possibility that digoxin intoxication played  
23 a part in this child's death cannot be totally  
24 ruled out. The events of the death and the  
25 circumstances surrounding it may add some weight to





BB8

1

the digoxin findings. I would like to say that, in my submission, only a relatively low level of suspicion attaches to the death of Charlton Gardner.

Mr. Commissioner, it is clear that we are now getting to the point, if indeed we have not already reached or passed it, where the toxicological information on children is so unclear or so ambiguous that the pharmacologists find difficulty in expressing an opinion on it. You have seen that in the cases, particularly of Dr. Kauffman, with several of the children already discussed. That group of children comprise those who had findings, albeit on fixed tissue, which were comparable, at least in numbers, with the ranges of fatal toxic concentrations in fresh tissue and that, in light of the evidence of Mr. Cimbura, he would expect to see concentrations of digoxin reduced after tissue has been fixed.

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CC-1

RD/ac

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There are other children for whom we do have toxicological data of greater or lesser value. I propose to go now to the rest of those children for whom there are any toxicological data at all. They are in chronological order of their deaths: Laura Woodcock, Amber Dawson, Brian Gage, Francis Volk, Matthew Lutes, John Onofre, Colleen Warner, and Michelle Manojlovich.

Once we have been through those we are then into children for whom we have no digoxin information, other than digoxin levels taken during life, as part of therapeutic monitoring.

First of all, Laura Woodcock. Her death was a mystery, Mr. Commissioner. That her congenital heart disease was not severe is certainly not sufficiently severe to account for her death, was the view of Dr. Hastreiter who gave her a severity rating of 2 and Dr. Nadas, who thought her prognosis was good and Dr. Mirkin. Indeed as I understand the evidence of Dr. Rowe and of Dr. Freedom, they were of the same view as also was Dr. deSa.

At page 33 of the chart is the final page of the final autopsy report and final paragraph which is of interest.

" Congenital heart disease was not





CC-2

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" judged to be a significant problem  
with respect to the sudden death  
of this infant. There was a  
small membranous ventricular septal  
defect and a persistent left superior  
vena cava with proximal  
connection to the coronary sinus.  
Though the pulmonary valve leaflets  
were thickened, there was no evidence  
of pulmonary stenosis or sclerosis  
of the pulmonary outflow tract.  
A small haematoma on the anterior  
mitral valve leaflet, superficial  
cerebral venous congestion, congestion  
of kidneys, adrenal medulla and  
spleen and small serous effusions  
of mesothelial surfaces reflect  
agonal changes. The exact cause  
of the sudden, cardiorespiratory  
arrest is uncertain. No organisms  
were cultured from the lungs at  
postmortem, but the child was on  
intravenous antibiotics. "

22

Two things from that final paragraph or that  
penultimate paragraph.

24

25





CC-3

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2                   One, the exact cause of the arrest  
3 is not established, but, two, the child's congenital  
4 heart anomalies were not judged to be a significant  
5 problem in the context of her death. She also had  
6 a liver problem, as we know.

7                   You all remember very well Dr. Weber's  
8 brief appearance here, but again, that was not  
9 considered sufficiently severe to explain her  
10 death. Indeed, at the time of her death, the death  
11 was not only unexpected, but unexplained. It was  
12 reported to the coroner. This is one of those cases in  
13 which reporting to the referring physician, Dr.  
14 Freedom, described the death as sudden and not  
15 expected. Whether that description was apt every  
time he used it, I do not say, but in my submission  
it was apt and accurate here.

16                  Dr. Rowe suggested that once the autopsy  
17 results were known the mystery disappeared and he  
18 considered the findings of pneumonia satisfactorily  
19 explained the death. His evidence in that regard  
20 is found in Volume 18, page 3058.

21                  I say, with respect to the pathologists,  
22 do not appear to have shared that view. I have  
23 read the penultimate paragraph of the report and there  
is no suggestion there, in my submission that the

24

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CC-4

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2 pathologist regarded findings of pneumonia referred  
3 to in the top paragraph of page 53 as being the  
4 cause of the death or of the arrest or anything  
5 else.

6

7 In my respectful submission, Laura  
8 Woodcock's death has never been explained on clinical  
9 grounds, but die she did and that at 9:40 in the  
morning on June 30, 1980 on ward 4B. She was one  
year old.

10

11 The Trayner nursing team was on  
12 duty on ward 4A at the time Baby Woodcock got into  
13 her terminal difficulties. The events of her last  
14 night are set out at page 50 in the chart, Nurse  
15 Bracewell's note. At the top of the page, June 30th,  
16 1980, at 0400 the apex was regular at 90. Blood  
17 pressure 90 over pulse. No respiratory difficulties  
18 noted, but she was lethargic. Two hours later,  
19 6:00, blood pressure has dropped to 70 over pulse.  
20 Her heart rate has gone up to 100 and is irregular  
21 and she has vomited twice. She remains lethargic. Seven  
22 o'clock that decline appears to be continuing. Blood  
23 pressure is now down to 62 over pulse. Heart rate  
24 is down to 86 and is irregular and she is very  
25 lethargic and she has vomited again a small amount  
of mucus.





CC-5

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2 Dr. Schaffer was there. Dr. Schaffer's  
3 note is halfway down the page, 30th of June, 7:30.

4

" Child looking lethargic, vomiting,  
5 irregular pulse. Lethargic, pulse  
6 75, nothing for respiration, blood  
7 pressure down to 62. Chest clear.

8

Liver down 4 centimetres. "

9

ECG he says is recording heart block - atrial  
10 ventricular dissociation. The ventricular rate  
11 is 70 to 75. There is an impression or differential  
12 diagnoses he notes at the bottom of the page:  
13 toxicity, electrolyte imbalance, bilirubin toxicity.

14

I go back to Nurse Bracewell's note  
15 far up the page. The course is then followed at  
16 5 minute intervals from 8:00 o'clock. Atropine produced  
17 a good result. The heart rate and blood pressure  
18 both went up. The baby was still very lethargic,  
19 and a couple of minutes after 9:00 the cardiac arrest  
20 and a Code 25 was called.

21

That appears on page 51, in Dr. Rowe's  
22 note. Time 9:35:

23

" Infant had cardiac arrest 0903 hours.  
24 Resuscitative attempts continuing,  
25 but response poor so far. Sequence  
of events raises possibility of viral





" type infection and despite the absence of heart failure under observation, the conduction system became involved. Electrolytes and blood gases at the time when arrhythmia started were normal so that it seems unlikely acidosis or respiratory arrest was responsible. The baby was covered by gentamicin for the possibility of sepsis. Other investigative studies were underway and the GI Service had seen the baby. There was no indication of impending decay in the condition and plans were in train to transfer the infant this week to the GI Service. The cause of the episode is thus quite uncertain. "

There was general agreement that in the course of  
her terminal events Baby Woodcock displayed symptoms  
that were consistent with digoxin toxicity. Dr. Mirkin regarded  
the symptoms and especially the heart block in AV  
dissociation as very telling. His evidence at  
Volume 87, pages 8963 to 4, and Volume 88, 9054 to 64.





CC-7

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2 Dr. Rowe agreed that the symptoms  
3 of digoxin intoxication were present.

4 Although Dr. Kauffman gave Baby  
5 Woodcock a digoxin score of only one, because of the  
6 lack of clear toxicological data and the CDC  
7 classified the death as being consistent with the  
special concern with respect to digoxin.

8 While at the Hospital for Sick Children  
9 Laura Woodcock had only antibiotics prescribed for  
her, ampicillin and gentamicin. She had been on  
10 digoxin at the Oshawa General Hospital, but digoxin  
had been discontinued prior to her transfer to the  
11 Hospital for Sick Children. She had been in the  
12 Hospital for Sick Children since June 26th and I  
13 see no prescribed or recorded dose of digoxin.  
14

15 Subsequently, Laura Woodcock's  
16 body was exhumed and an autopsy was performed on  
the exhumed body and muscle tissues sample was sent  
17 to the Centre for Forensic Sciences for digoxin  
assay. Traces of digoxin and/or digoxin-like  
18 substances were found, the concentration of 4 nanograms  
19 per gram.  
20

21 In other words, Mr. Commissioner,  
22 there are essentially no toxicological data for  
23 Laura Woodcock. The finding in the exhumed muscle  
24

25





CC-8

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2       is essentially meaningless. A judgement as to  
3       the cause of Laura Woodcock's death, therefore,  
4       turns in my submission on an assessment of the  
5       clinical picture as a whole, and a review of the  
6       circumstances surrounding her death. All that we  
7       know is, first, her death was unexpected and, second,  
8       it was when it occurred, and in my submission, still  
9       is unexplained in terms of her clinical and diseased  
conditions.

10                     Third, it was a sudden death. The  
11          final episode characterized by symptoms known to be  
12          associated with digoxin toxicity.

13                     Fourth, she got into trouble during  
14          the long nightshift when members of the Trayner  
15          nursing team were on duty on the other side of the  
16          ward, and it is my submission that you may conclude  
17          in all the circumstances that the death of Laura  
18          Woodcock was on in which there has to be grave suspicion  
19          that digoxin toxicity played a part. If it did  
20          that toxicity had to result from an unprescribed dose  
21          of digoxin, because the baby was not on the drug at  
22          the Hospital for Sick Children.

23                     THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, that  
24          I hadn't appreciated. The baby had had --

25                     MR. LAMEK: At Oshawa.





CC-9

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2 THE COMMISSIONER: I see.

3 MR. LAMEK: My other presumably  
4 more reliable source of information, Miss Cronk  
5 tells me the source of information on which I relied  
6 as to the age of this child is quite wrong. Laura  
7 Woodcock was three weeks and not one year old.8 I come then to Amber Dawson, sir.  
9 In addition to the circumstantial considerations  
10 arising from patent, Amber Dawson died at 2:40 in  
11 the morning, July 28, room 418. The Trayner team,  
12 or members of it, being then on duty.13 In addition to those considerations  
14 there are certain objective medical facts about this  
15 case which taken together may, in my submission,  
16 arouse suspicion about the death of this child.  
17 First, the death, I suggest, was sudden and unexpected.  
18 Baby Dawson had comeback to the Hospital for Sick  
19 Children because she was failing to thrive. Her  
20 earlier surgery had apparently been successful. Her  
21 cardiac condition was not such as to make her  
22 physicians and nurses believe she was at risk of  
23 death. There was surprise and puzzlement that Amber  
24 Dawson died.25 Second, no clear cause of death  
was ever identified. You will recall, sir, I know,





CC-10

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2       that initially no one knew what had carried Baby  
3       Dawson away.

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2 DD/DM/ko You will remember the 4A communications book  
3 the cause of Amber's death is something of a puzzle.  
4 It was hoped the mystery would be cleaned up at  
5 autopsy and in my submission it was not. The autopsy  
6 report begins at page 59 of the chart and I refer in  
7 particular to page 63 where Dr. Cutz performing an  
8 autopsy at the behest of the coroner completed the  
autopsy form and for the cause of death wrote:

9 "The immediate anatomical cause of  
10 death not determined."

11 He listed two matters which he called  
12 "contributing factors", they were later to be  
13 translated into underlying causes you will remember  
14 in the coroner's report, they were described as  
15 contributing factors: "Congenital heart disease,  
right hemidiaphragm paralysis".

16 There is no cause, no underlying cause  
17 identified in the autopsy report.

18 The perforated stomach upon which  
19 Dr. Bain relied as the trigger of Baby Dawson's arrest  
20 was not even mentioned by Dr. Cutz as a contributing  
21 factor much less as a cause of any degree. It is  
22 described at the top of page 63 but is in no way  
23 referred to as being part of the cause of death.

24 The third factor, which in my submission

25





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DD 2

2

is important with respect to Baby Dawson is that the events leading to her death had a sudden onset and included symptoms of digoxin toxicity.

Nurse Nelles' note for the long night of July 27th, 28th is found at page 80 of the chart and clearly she gives, in the middle of the page, a description of the child in the early part of the night shift is not the picture of a totally stable child. Respirations appear laboured at times, up to 62 per minute at 2400, at midnight. The apex ranging between 106 and 130 and regular and lethargic behaviour. Lasix was given IV, hardly the indication of a child in an absolutely stable healthy condition, she was sick and there was no question of that. It doesn't sound like a well baby but I suggest there is still very little in the early part of that shift as described by Miss Nelles to prepare one for what suddenly occurred at 1:30. At 1:30 the heart rate which had been ranging between 106 to 180 was noted to be dropping, it dropped to 79 and below. The baby started to gag with some seizure activity and a Code 25 was called. Page 84 of the chart is Dr. Williams' arrest note in which he records, no doubt with a narration of Miss Nelles:

23

24

25





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2 "Sudden recent deterioration leading  
3 to collapse. Initial condition  
4 gasping spontaneously with aspiration  
5 extreme bradycardic."

6 There was no response at all to the  
7 resuscitation efforts. No matter what was done,  
8 adrenaline, whatever it was, the same note "no response,  
9 still asystole", and after 50 minutes of effort after  
10 having produced any electrical response at all in the  
11 child resuscitation was discontinued on Dr. Izukawa's  
12 advice. That is to say in the manner of her dying  
13 Amber Dawson also fit a familiar pattern; sudden onset,  
14 a dramatic change in cardiac behaviour, progressed  
15 swiftly to arrest and could not be revived. That is  
16 the case for suspicion as to Amber Dawson. She fits  
17 all the patterns and her death is not satisfactorily  
18 explained in terms of her clinical status or her  
19 disease condition.

20 The toxicological information about her  
21 is hardly helpful, this is found in 95A at page 11.  
22 For the left ventricle, although 19 nanograms per gram  
23 of something like dig. was recorded, presumably after  
24 HPLC on a subsequent RIA no digoxin was identified.  
25 For the left atrium by RIA 15 nanograms per gram of  
of digoxin or digoxin-like substance were recorded.





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DD 4

2

In the septum 19 nanograms of digoxin-like substances but no digoxin at all. In the lungs similarly no digoxin or some digoxin-like substances were recorded. Certainly no case can be made on the basis of that information that digoxin toxicity played any part in Amber Dawson's death.

7

Baby Dawson's death in my submission remains a mystery and the cause of the death is plainly something about which skilled and reasonable physicians may disagree and indeed have disagreed. The CDC placed this child in Category A on the basis that her death was unexpected and inconsistent with her clinical status consistent with digoxin intoxication.

13

Dr. Kauffman couldn't opine on the question of digoxin involvement in the death. The lack of clear digoxin data made it impossible for him to do so, and for lack of clear data he gave her a digoxin score of 1.

18

Dr. Hastreiter who may be considered by some to be rather a hawk on digoxin related deaths in this matter could go no further than to say digoxin overdose was possible and that there was a fair probability of digoxin overdose.

22

Dr. Mirkin considered that the symptoms exhibited by the child, vomiting, lethargy, anorexia were not attributable to digoxin toxicity of which he

25





DD 5

1

2 saw no evidence.

3 There is, I suggest, a nagging question  
4 about the death of the Dawson baby and it arises  
5 mainly from the inability to provide a cause of death  
6 from her clinical condition. At the end of the day  
7 that nagging question may be enough to justify your  
8 concluding that some level of suspicion is aroused  
9 here. In my submission and the CDC to the contrary  
10 notwithstanding any such suspicion has to be of a  
relatively low order.

11 I am reminded, Mr. Commissioner, and  
12 the point is a perfectly proper one, it was also part  
13 of Dr. Kauffman's evidence that because the tissues of  
14 Amber Dawson had been fixed in Klotz solution for an  
extended period of time, and since she was one of the  
15 first children to die, one of the longest of all, the  
lack of significant digoxin levels in those tissues  
16 is in a sense a non-fact, you can neither infer  
17 digoxin toxicity from them neither can you rule it out  
18 on the basis of the low level, there is no evidence  
19 that propels you in either direction.

20 The next child, sir, is Brian Gage.  
21 Brian Gage died at 4 o'clock in the morning of August  
22 27th, 1980 at Room 418, he was a month old. Once  
23 again the members of the Trayner team were on duty the

24

25





DD 6

1  
2 night that he died. Surgery had been scheduled but he  
3 died before reaching the OR. I am sorry, I said he  
4 died August 29th, he died September 25th, forgive me,  
5 surgery had been scheduled for September 25th, the  
6 very day that he died and he died early in the morning  
and of course did not reach the OR.

7 In a blood sample that was drawn at 4  
8 o'clock the afternoon before he died, a digoxin  
9 concentration of 3.5 nanograms per millilitre was  
10 measured. You will remember he had received a double  
11 dose of digoxin by error that day and the incident  
12 report referring to that is Exhibit 308. Digoxin was  
13 held as a result of that and it was not resumed before  
14 he died. None of the pharmacologists considered the  
15 3.5 level to be related to the cause of his death.  
16 The toxicological information on Brian Gage is no more  
17 clear than it was on the last two pages that I have  
18 discussed. In Exhibit 95E on page 4 there is a report  
19 on three specimens obtained from this baby's exhumed  
body and one specimen of what appears to be the ante  
mortem serum but it says it was drawn prior to August  
20 11th, 1980, which is rather remarkable since the child  
21 was not born until August 27th, 1980, so what we make  
22 of that ante mortem sample I do not know. It certainly  
23 cannot be taken as indicating any serum digoxin

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concentration on any given day let alone at or close to the day of his death.

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In the exhumed material a muscle sample showed only traces of digoxin or digoxin-like substances. Digoxin was identified in samples of contents of large and small intestines, but according to Mr. Cimbura those levels do not appear to indicate any toxicity although of course he treats them as inconclusive either way because of the serious problem of interpreting levels in exhumed tissues.

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Brian Gage was a blue baby, he had congested heart failure which had been controlled by digoxin and diuretics until he could get to surgery. Among the non Hospital for Sick Children physicians there was a difference of opinion as to whether the baby's death could be explained by his clinical condition. Dr. Nadas for the CDC considered Gage's prognosis as guarded. Dr. Mirkin thought the death was to be expected, that the child was showing signs of deterioration, that evidence is at Volume 87, pages 8858-8859. Dr. Hastreiter was the voice in opposition. Although he conceded that it was possible that Brian Gage's death resulted from his diseased condition. He thought the prognosis with surgery was reasonably good. He did not think the child to be at immediate





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DD 8

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risk of death and considered that he should not have died from his disease.

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The cardiologists at the Hospital for Sick Children did consider the death to have been caused by the baby's condition, and Dr. Freedom in particular considered hypoxia to be the cause of death. Dr. Kauffman, Dr. Hastreiter and Dr. Mirkin all considered the death to be consistent with digoxin toxicity although to varying degrees. Dr. Mirkin thought there to be some evidence of digoxin toxicity in the child's terminal symptoms. Dr. Hastreiter not only considered the nature of the symptoms to be consistent with digoxin toxicity, but he also viewed the unexpected nature as he saw it, the unexpected nature of the terminal event itself to be further evidence of toxicity.

Dr. Kauffman thought the death and terminal symptoms to be highly consistent with digoxin toxicity, which is why despite utterly inconclusive digoxin data he gave a digoxin score of 2 to Brian Gage. Although he thought the death to be highly consistent with digoxin intoxication he said he could not with any confidence say that digoxin toxicity was the cause of death, and that of course in light of the lack of clear toxicological information.





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DD 9 2 With respect to the nature of the

3 terminal event itself, may I refer to Nurse Scott's  
4 notes at page 65 of the chart. She records that the  
5 child is in no respiratory distress on September 24-  
25. Vital signs were stable, he was not cyanosed.

6 He vomitted the 9:30 p.m. feed and he also vomitted  
7 later half strength formula and then later D5W,  
8 glucose water. Nurse Scott left him to go for her  
9 break. When she came back the baby's condition was  
10 as it was when she left him, this was her evidence  
11 you will remember. Shortly afterwards she sat him up  
12 to burp him, put him down again and his heart rate  
13 suddenly plummeted to 49 and was weak.

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EE  
DP/cr

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CPR was started, Code 25, the arrest note is found on page 64.

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"Called in to see re sudden cardio-respiratory arrest. Apparently had been vomiting tonight and had respiratory distress today. During a feed of clear fluid, suddenly arrested."

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Down at the bottom:

"Initial response to resuscitation but bradycardia recurred and did not respond to further resuscitation.

Pupils fixed and dilated."

4:00 p.m. child pronounced dead.

What we have here, Mr. Commissioner,

is a replay of what is fast becoming a classic conundrum. The death in the view of at least one physician was not really expected or adequately explained on the basis of the child's clinical condition. The autopsy report confirms the diagnosis about congenital heart defects, confirms the evidence of congestive heart failure but does not identify a cause of death. Perhaps that may be taken as some justification or corroboration for Dr. Hastreiter's view. There was a sudden precipitous and irreversible





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2 decline in the early hours of the morning in the  
3 presence of one nursing team and we have external  
4 symptoms which are consistent with digoxin intoxication  
5 so much so, in the opinion of Dr. Kauffman that he  
6 scores the death as a 2 for digoxin toxicity not-  
7 withstanding the lack of any toxicological evidence  
of any significance.

8

9 Then we have totally unhelpful  
10 digoxin tests. Which way the inference is going on  
that is a difficult question that you have to decide.  
11 It is my submission, sir, that those elements taken  
12 together, sufficient to justify regarding the death  
as suspicious, have perhaps a somewhat higher level  
13 of suspicion than that which I suggested for Amber  
14 Dawson.

15

16 THE COMMISSIONER: Before you go on,  
I notice the time - are you leaving Brian Gage now?

17

18 MR. LAMEK: Yes, I am leaving Brian  
Gage, sir.

19

20 THE COMMISSIONER: Do you want to --

21

22 MR. LAMEK: I would like not to come  
back after the break but perhaps I could deal with  
Francis Volk before we take the break. I will not  
be long with him.

23

24 Francis Volk was three months old when

25





1  
2 he died. He died in Room 418 at 5:15 in the afternoon  
3 of October 23rd when one or more members of the  
4 Trayner team were on duty. Francis Volk was an  
5 extremely sick child. He spent the whole of his short  
6 life in the Hospital, being transferred to the Hospital  
7 for Sick Children at the age of one day. He underwent  
8 surgery twice and had severe congenital heart defects  
9 and congenital lung defects. He suffered from  
10 congestive heart failure. He had respiratory distress  
11 throughout his life and latterly was suffering from  
bronchial pneumonia.

12 At autopsy the death was attributed  
13 to a combination of pneumonia and severe congestive  
14 heart failure. On the last night of the baby's life  
15 Nurse Scott made the observation which is recorded in  
16 her note at page 146 of the chart, Volume II of the  
17 Volk chart, the long night nursing note is in the  
18 middle of the page, perhaps one-third of the way  
19 down: Chest sounds clear after suction, air entry  
20 reduced on the right side. Perhaps you could compare  
21 that to the top of the page, the long day nursing  
22 note: chest good air entry after physio otherwise  
23 very rattley. Evidently by the time the night time  
24 came around there was reduced air entry on the right  
side. The colour was pale, although he was in 70  
per cent oxygen.





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4 Very sweaty, very clammy throughout the night.

3

Restless. Did not settle until after midnight  
4 feed. Respiration: 30 to 50 sub sternal intercostal  
indrawing and he had a difficult time breathing  
5 apparently. The apex was regular and in the range between  
6 120 and 143.

7

On October 23rd of the long day at page  
8 147, Nurse Ganassin's note I suggest establishes the  
9 same sort of picture as on the previous night.

10

Child vomited approximately 30 ccs two hours after his  
11 last feed at 1400. Apex was regular ranging from  
12 147-137-153 before the arrest. Before the arrest it  
13 went up to 200. The same respiratory symptoms,  
14 intercostal sub sternal indrawing throughout the day;  
15 blood pressure stable; quiet all morning; distressed  
16 with bath; settled well. Very restless after lunch.  
17 Then a brief terse one line "1650 ceased and arrested.  
Code called".

18

The physician's note on page 146  
19 reports, I believe his note is complete on page 145,  
the pages are bound out of order, Mr. Commissioner.  
20 He reports that he was called to see Francis for  
21 vomiting and tachycardia, found a pulse of 160,  
22 respiratory rate of 60, pale with indrawn respiration.  
23 Then follows the arrest note on page 145. Code 23

24

25

EE  
DP/cr





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2 was called and it says a full code followed, the IV  
3 team. Upon arrival he was without heart beat. He was  
4 intubated by the anesthetist, had no pulse, bicarb  
5 was given and so on. Went into ventricular fibrillation,  
6 an attempt was made for conversion of that  
7 fibrillation flat line, did not respond, pronounced  
8 dead at 1715.

9

10 Other than vomiting, which may well be  
11 the least specific of all symptoms I would have  
12 thought, I suggest Baby Volk did not exhibit any of  
13 the known symptoms of digoxin toxicity. No one  
14 suggested that his death was anything other than  
15 natural caused by his diseased condition.

16

17 In my submission there is nothing in  
18 the chart or in the evidence that provides any basis  
19 for disagreeing with the unanimous experts' view that  
20 this death was a natural one and in my respectful  
21 submission, sir, you should so find.

22

23 I would be grateful if we could break  
24 until tomorrow morning.

25

26 THE COMMISSIONER: Until 10 o'clock  
27 tomorrow morning.

28

29 MR. LAMEK: Thank you, sir.

30

31 ---Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3:20 p.m. until  
32 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, June 12th, 1984.

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